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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This matter is before the Court on appeal from a final order of the Utah Labor 
Commission. Jurisdiction is appropriate in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 
34A-2-801(9); 630-4-403(1); and 78A-4-103(2)(a)(i)(A). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. The Utah Labor Commission incorrectly, and by improper means, found that 
Mondragon sustained an industrial accident. 
2. The Utah Labor Commission incorrectly found that Mondragon's alleged 
industrial accident satisfies the medical causation element of an accident claim. 
3. The Utah Labor Commission improperly denied Respondents' request for 
additional discovery concerning the veracity of Mondragon's injury claim. 
4. The Utah Labor Commission took improper sua sponte actions in asserting 
accident theories on Mondragon's behalf, and awarding benefits based thereon. 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUES: All issues on appeal were raised and preserved 
through JP's Motion for Review and Motion for Reconsideration. [R. at 166-198; 207-
212.] 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Relief from a final order of the Utah Labor Commission 
shall be granted if the party seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by 
the Commission's erroneous interpretation or application of law, a finding of fact not 
supported by substantial evidence, or by agency action that is an abuse of discretion or 
otherwise arbitrary and capricious. Utah Code Ann. § 630-4-403( 4 ). 
ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case arises from Mondragon' s claim of entitlement to workers' compensation 
benefits for a right knee injury allegedly caused by his employment with JP's 
Landscaping. Respondents, JP' s Landscaping and Auto Owners Insurance ( collectively 
"JP's") disputed the validity of Mondragon's claim. During the evidentiary hearing, the 
accident alleged by Mondragon to have caused his injury was disproved. The 
Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") entered findings documenting that fact, but 
nonetheless proceeded to refer Mondragon' s claim for consideration by a medical panel 
on the basis of her own alternative accident theory, and eventually entered an order 
awarding benefits to Mondragon based thereupon. 
Through objections and interlocutory motions, JP's challenged the ALJ's actions 
as improper. JP's argued that the ALJ's adoption of an alternative mechanism of injury 
not asserted by Mondragon was improper, lacked evidentiary support, and constituted 
impermissible advocacy by the Labor Commission. The Utah Labor Commission adopted 
the ALJ' s actions as proper, further compounded the same through its own unsupported 
findings, and declined to correct the errors on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Mondragon, through an August 17, 2012 Application for Hearing, alleged 
that on May 22, 2012, his first day of employment with JP' s, he was injured in an 
industrial accident when his right knee was "caught" by the handles of a tipping 
wheelbarrow. [R. at 1] 
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2. JP's filed an Answer denying liability for Mondragon's claims, asserting 
that Mondragon's condition was not caused by the alleged accident. [R. at 17.] 
3. On the date of the alleged industrial injury, Mondragon was seen by Dr. 
Britt at Work.Med. Mondragon reported that he was at work pushing a wheelbarrow that 
tipped to the side. Mondragon alleged that the two handles of the wheelbarrow caught his 
leg and twisted it in different directions, causing pressure on his knee. The treating 
physician found that Mondragon' s knee was normal in appearance, showing no bruising 
with only a possibility of slight swelling, and diagnosed a right knee sprain. [R. 220 at 
30.] 
4. Only one other treatment record documents Mondragon's reported 
mechanism of injury. Mondragon reported to Dr. Andruss that he was pushing a 
wheelbarrow which fell on its side, trapping his right knee in a rotation type injury. [R. 
220 at 52.] 
5. Mondragon was later examined by Dr. Bart Fotheringham, who offered a 
diagnosis of right knee pain syndrome with possible meniscal abnormalities and 
degenerative changes. Dr. Fotheringham found that Mondragon has an extensive history 
of prior knee pain and that the alleged industrial accident only temporarily aggravated 
Mondragon' s preexisting right knee degenerative changes. [R. 220 at 64 (pp. 11-13 of 
report).] 
6. During the discovery period, JP's discovered a history of industrial claims 
demonstrating a pattern whereby both Mondragon and his adult son had claimed multiple 
industrial injuries at the same prior, successive employers. [R. 180-198.] In an effort to 
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investigate the questionable claims history, JP' s requested releases from Mondragon' s 
adult son to obtain claims information that JP's deemed relevant to determining the 
veracity of Mondragon's claim. [R. at 23 (notifying the ALJ that JP's suspected fraud); 
R. at 28.] Mondragon refused to comply with JP's discovery efforts, and the Commission 
declined to compel the production of the requested information. [R. at 63.] 
7. During the evidentiary hearing before the ALJ, and upon direct questions 
by the ALJ, Mondragon offered testimony consistent with his Application for Hearing 
and his reports to the treating physicians. During his presentation of evidence, 
Mondragon definitively testified that as he was pushing a large wheelbarrow full of 
gravel, it tipped to the right side, catching and twisting his right knee between the two 
handles. [R. 221 at 14:17-25; 15:1; Transcript also attached hereto as "Addendum A."] 
8. Upon cross examination, Mondragon again affirmed his allegation that his 
right knee became entrapped between the two handles of the tipping wheelbarrow. [R. 
221 at 22:12-16.] Mondragon unequivocally testified that as the wheelbarrow tipped to 
the right, the handles caught him above and below his knee, with one handle striking the 
outside of his right leg, and the other handle striking the inside of the leg. [R. 221 at 
24:2-5, 10-15.] Mondragon testified that the injury occurred "when both handles-when 
my knee was between both handles, my bone popped." [R. 221 at 24: 15-17.] 
9. JP' s provided a similarly sized wheelbarrow for an in-court physical 
demonstration. [R. 221 at 26:5-7]. Mondragon's demonstration with the wheelbarrow 
showed that it was not physically possible for the two handles of the wheelbarrow to 
simultaneously strike or catch any location on his leg, and that the handles could not have 
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caught and twisted his leg. The demonstration showed that with the wheelbarrow tipped 
on its side, with the right handle resting on the ground, the left handle was actually higher 
than Mondragon' s leg, resting at a position at or just below Mondragon' s waist. [R. 221 
at 27:22-25; 28:1-13.] 
10. Mondragon first testified that there were no witnesses to the accident, and 
then alleged that an unidentified co-worker was a witness. However, Mondragon was 
unable to produce or identify that alleged witness. [R. 221 at 19:25; 20:1-11]. 
11. Based upon Mondragon's in-court demonstration, the questionable 
circumstances of the alleged event, the absence of medically documented evidence of a 
traumatic injury, and the absence of corroborating witnesses, JP's asserted that the 
accident alleged by Mondragon did not occur, and that Mondragon' s claim must be 
dismissed as a result. [R. 221 at 31 :23-25 to 3 5: 1-17.] 
12. The ALJ issued an Interim Order finding that the accident alleged by 
Mondragon, as shown by "an in court demonstration . . . could not have occurred as 
described." [R. at 75.] 
13. The ALJ found that "[t]he exact mechanism of injury is unclear," and 
referred the matter to a medical panel for evaluation. [R. at 75-76.] The ALJ's findings 
regarding a mechanism of injury were limited to a finding that "Mr. Mondragon was 
working with a wheel barrow full of gravel at the time of the injury ... he lost control of 
the load and it tipped ... It is clear that Mr. Mondragon felt a pop in the knee." [R. at 75.] 
14. JP's filed an Interlocutory Motion for Review arguing that the Panel 
referral was made in error since Mondragon had failed to prove that his accident as 
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alleged had occurred. JP's argued that even if the ALJ somehow found that some 
unclaimed alternative theory of accident did occur, Mondragon had provided no 
evidentiary or medical support for such a theory. [R. at 81-95.] 
15. Mondragon did not respond to JP's Interlocutory Motion. 
16. The Commission declined to undertake interlocutory review of the matter. 
[R. at 96.] 
17. Upon receipt of the Medical Panel Report, JP's filed an objection thereto 
arguing again that the referral was improper, and that in any event, the Panel had engaged 
in improper fact finding by assuming the existence of a twisting mechanism of injury that 
was contrary to the facts in evidence, causing the Panel to ultimately base its conclusions 
upon the mechanism of injury that had been disproved. [R. at 107 .] 
18. Mondragon did not respond to JP's Medical Panel Objection. 
19. Through her September 3, 2014, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order, the ALJ affirmed her previous factual finding that Mondragon' s alleged injury 
could not have occurred as alleged. The ALJ stated that Mondragon' s "accident 
description is flawed in the details," and then proceeded to assert an alternative 
mechanism of injury on behalf of Mondragon, namely, that Mondragon "did use his legs 
and body to try and keep control of the wheel barrow and when the heavy load tipped he 
and the wheel barrow where [sic] jerked and tousled." The ALJ found that "the evidence 
proved that an accident of substantial exertion took place," however the evidence upon 
which that finding was based was not identified. [R. at 118; Order also attached hereto as 
"Addendum B. "] 
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20. The ALJ asserted that Mondragon may have been confused or may have 
had a flawed recollection about the mechanism of injury. No evidentiary support for such 
an assumption was identified by the ALJ. [R. at 118.] 
21. JP's filed a Motion for Review with the Commission argumg that 
Mondragon' s claim was erroneously referred to a Panel and that benefits were awarded 
upon an accident theory improperly developed and asserted solely by the ALJ, which 
lacked factual support, when the claim should have been dismissed upon Mondragon' s 
failure to prove the existence of the industrial accident that he alleged to have caused his 
injury. [R. at 124.] 
22. Mondragon did not respond to JP's Motion for Review. 
23. The Commissioner found Mondragon' s allegations of sudden-onset pain, in 
combination with his assessment at WorkMed shortly after the alleged injury, to be 
sufficient to persuade her that Mondragon did suffer a right knee injury as a result of the 
alleged accident. The Commissioner found that "the exact mechanism of injury is 
unclear," but echoed the ALJ in noting that where a worker is confused about the 
mechanism of injury, the lack of a clear description of the same is not necessarily fatal to 
a claim. Ultimately, the Commissioner made the narrow factual finding that the evidence 
on record established that "Mondragon's right knee was subject to stress while the fully 
loaded wheelbarrow tipped over." Finding that the Panel's conclusion was based upon a 
mechanism of injury inconsistent with the evidence established during the hearing, the 
Commissioner issued a remand for reevaluation by the Panel based upon her clarified 
findings of fact. [R. at 141-145.] 
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24. The ALJ re-submitted the matter to the Medical Panel, with instructions 
regarding the mechanism of injury. Utilizing the Commissioner's findings of fact, the 
ALJ's referral memorandum stated: ';the exact mechanism of injury was unclear. What is 
established in the record is that Mr. Mondragon's right knee was subject to stress while 
the fully loaded wheelbarrow tipped over." The referral memorandum also made clear 
that the Panel is "bound by the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" issued by the 
Commission. [R. at 148.] 
25. In its revised report, the Medical Panel made additional factual assumptions 
not contained in the record. The Panel assumed that Mondragon "tried to plant his feet to 
stabilize the wheelbarrow" and that Mondragon "tried to right an out-of-control 
wheelbarrow. He was trying to hold the wheelbarrow from tipping. In doing so, he 
straightened or bent his knee under considerable abnormal stress." Based upon those 
assumptions, the Panel assumed that Mondragon had a history of "a violent stressful 
motion type injury" that was consistent with being the industrial cause of his right knee 
injury. [R. 152-53.] 
26. Upon receipt of the revised Panel Report, the ALJ issued an Order on 
Remand that cursorily adopted the Panel's conclusions and affirmed the prior award of 
benefits to Mondragon. [R. at 159-160.] 
27. JP's filed a second Motion for Review, arguing again that the award of 
benefits was improper due to Mondragon' s failure to prove the accident he alleged, and 
that it was based upon improper assumptions by the Commission, ALJ, and Medical 
Panel regarding the existence of an accident different from the one alleged by 
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Mondragon. JP's argued that the Commission's assumed mechanism of injury lacked 
medical support and that, at minimum, a remand was necessary to allow JP's the 
opportunity to conduct the previously requested discovery into the veracity of 
Mondragon' s claims history that was denied during the discovery phase of the case. [R. at 
166-177.] 
28. Mondragon did not respond to JP' s second Motion for Review. 
29. The Commission again denied JP's Motion for Review. It held that "the 
evidence in the record supports Mr. Mondragon's claim that he sustained a right-knee 
injury during the work accident even if it did not happen exactly as he described it to 
have occurred." Expanding its former factual findings to comport more closely with the 
Medical Panel's assumptions, the Commission stated that "the record does show that 
[Mondragon's] right knee was subject to significant stress while carrying a fully loaded 
wheelbarrow that tipped over." [R. at 203 (emphasis added); Order Affirming ALJ's 
Decision also attached hereto as "Addendum C."] 
30. Rejecting JP's argument that the ALJ improperly advocated on behalf of 
Mondragon, the Commission held that "it is not uncommon for an injured worker to be 
unclear about a specific exertion that leads to an internal injury." The Commission held 
that it "does not agree with JP that [the ALJ] advocated on behalf of Mr. Mondragon by 
advancing an alternate theory of the accident because the significant stress on his right 
knee was well-established in the record." [R. at 203.] The Commission noted that "JP had 
notice of the circumstances of the accident as they were outlined by Dr. Britt at 
WorkMed almost immediately after the accident" noting that Dr. Britt had documented 
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Mondragon's alleged mechanism of injury during that first visit, and holding that "[t]hese 
are the circumstances that were the basis for the prior decisions from [the ALJ] and the 
Commission. [R. at 203.] 
31. In affirming its award of benefits to Mondragon, the Commission explained 
how the result was reached in noting that "[t]he Appeals Board agrees with [the ALJ] and 
the Commission that an injured worker, especially one who is unrepresented like Mr. 
Mondragon, may make a mistake regarding an aspect of his or her claim and that the 
underlying evidence may be considered and addressed by the factfinder without crossing 
into advocacy or infringing on the due process rights of the employer or insurance carrier. 
That is essentially what took place in this case." [R. at 204.] 
32. Because the Commission's Order failed to address JP's request for a 
remand to conduct further discovery into Mondragon's questionable claims history, and 
the circumstances of the instant claim, JP's filed a Request for Reconsideration on that 
narrow issue. [R. at 207.] 
33. Mondragon did not respond to JP's Request for Reconsideration. 
34. In denying JP's Request for Reconsideration, the Commission held that 
JP's had presented "no actual evidence of fraud on Mr. Mondragon's part," and that "JP's 
assertion that Mr. Mondragon is not credible and may be committing fraud is no more 
than speculation without evidence of actual fraud." The Commission therefore declined 
to remand the case to allow further discovery. [R. at 217-18; Order Denying Request for 
Reconsideration also attached hereto as "Addendum D."] 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Commission's award of benefits to Mondragon is premised upon factual 
findings not supported by the evidence elicited at hearing, but solely upon unsupported 
inference and assumption by the ALJ and Commission. Upon conclusion of the 
evidentiary hearing, all evidence, including the medical records and Mondragon' s own 
testimony and in-court demonstration, pointed only to Mondragon' s unequivocal 
allegation that his knee was injured when it was caught and twisted between the handles 
of a tipping wheelbarrow. During the hearing, the mechanism of injury as alleged by 
Mondragon was disproved. Mondragon's claim should have been dismissed at that time. 
Notwithstanding the disproving of Mondragon's allegations, as well as 
circumstantial evidence of a potentially fraudulent claim (which JP's was prevented from 
developing into fact), the Commission proceeded to infer that Mondragon's unequivocal 
assertion of a specific mechanism of injury must have been a product of confusion. Based 
upon that inference of confusion, the Commission developed its own alternative theory 
premised not upon the evidence, but upon assumption of how such an accident could 
have happened. Notwithstanding the lack of medical support for the new theory of 
accident, the medical panel was improperly relied upon to create the only medical support 
for the same-upon which the award to Mondragon was ultimately based. 
Mondragon gave no indication of confusion in his claims or testimony. The 
inference of such confusion was unsupported and the Commission's creation, sua sponte, 
of an alternative theory based thereupon was improper and deprived JP's of its right to 
defend against the same. Mondragon neither raised nor supported the Commission's new 
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theory of accident, and the evidence in record offers no support therefor. The award of 
benefits to Mondragon is not premised upon the claims he raised and supported, nor are 
the facts thereof supported by substantial evidence. Instead, Mondragon's award is 
founded upon improper assumption and advocacy by the Commission and should not be 
allowed to stand. 
I. 
ARGUMENT 
Mondragon's award of benefits is improper as it is based upon 
unsupported factual findings. 
Where an award made by the Labor Commission "is based upon a determination 
of fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence," the 
award is improper and the appellate court may grant relief therefrom. 1 A showing of 
substantial supporting evidence requires the existence of "more than a mere scintilla of 
evidence ... though something less than the weight of the evidence. "2 If a reasonable 
mind cannot accept as adequate the evidence supporting the decision, if any, the factual 
finding cannot be upheld and any order based thereupon must be reversed.3 
Here, the award of benefits to Mondragon is premised upon factual findings issued 
and/or adopted by the ALJ and Commission that are based upon assumptions about how 
such an accident and injury could have happened, and not upon the actual evidence 
submitted by the parties during the evidentiary hearing. The award of benefits is not, 
therefore, based upon the evidence submitted by Mondragon in support of his claim, but 
1 Utah Code Ann.§ 63G-4-403(4)(g) 
2 Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus, 2007 UT 42,135, 164 P.3d 384. 
3 Id. 
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is instead based upon inferences which lack the support of substantial evidence in the 
record and information obtained through improper medical panel referrals. 
A. Presentation of the factual and procedural basis underlying the 
Commission's improper award of benefits to Mondragon. 
i. Mondragon's allegations of how the accident occurred were 
disproved at hearing. 
The first evidence in the record documenting Mondragon's allegations of how the 
alleged accident occurred is found in the somewhat limited medical record. Mondragon 
was seen by Dr. Britt on the date of the alleged accident. 4 There he reported that he was 
at work pushing a wheelbarrow that tipped to the side. Mondragon alleged that "as the 
wheelbarrow tilted, the handles to[ ok] hold [ of] him in different directions. This caused 
pressure on his LEFT(sic) [Right] knee and he felt a sudden pop in the knee."5 
Mondragon's allegations are similarly documented in his report to Dr. Andruss 
approximately a year later.6 The dictation details Mondragon's report that he was pushing 
a wheelbarrow at work which fell on its side, trapping his right knee in an external 
rotation type injury.7 
Through his application for benefits filed with the Commission, Mondragon again 
asserted that he sustained injury while working for JP's when his right knee was caught 
by falling wheelbarrow handles. His application details the mechanism of his injury as 
4 R. 220 at 30. 
s Id. 
6 R. 220 at 52. 
7 Id. 
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follows: "was carrying a full wheelbarrow and the wheelbarrow fell over, that is when it 
caught my knee and injured it."8 
Mondragon provided testimony consistent with his application and those medical 
reports during the evidentiary hearing before the ALJ. During his presentation of 
evidence, in responding to the ALJ's questions about the alleged accident, Mondragon 
unequivocally testified that as he was pushing a large wheelbarrow full of gravel, it 
tipped to the right side, catching and twisting his right knee between the two handles.9 
Upon cross examination, Mondragon again affirmed his allegation that his right knee 
became entrapped between the two handles of the tipping wheelbarrow. to Mondragon 
offered clear testimony that as the wheelbarrow tipped to the right, his knee was caught 
between the handles in a twisting motion with the handles above and below his knee, one 
catching the outside of his leg and the other catching the inside. 11 Mondragon testified 
that the injury to his right knee occurred "when both handles-when my knee was 
between both handles, my bone popped."12 
Following his verbal testimony regarding the alleged accident, Mondragon 
consented to provide an in-court physical demonstration with a similar wheelbarrow. 13 
Mondragon's demonstration with the wheelbarrow showed that it was not physically 
possible for the two handles of the wheelbarrow to simultaneously strike or catch any 
8 R. at 1. 
9 R. 221 at 14:17-25; 15:1; see "Addendum A." 
10 R. 221 at 22:12-16. 
11 R. 221 at 24:2-5, 10-15. 
12 R. 221 at 24: 15-17. 
13 R. 221 at 26:5-7. 
14 
location on his leg, and that the handles could not have caught and twisted his leg. 14 In 
accord with JP's argument that the accident as alleged by Mondragon did not occur, the 
ALJ found through the Interim Order that the physical demonstration in court proved that 
"the accident could not have occurred as described [by Mondragon]."15 
ii. The ALJ and Commission assumed that Mondragon was 
confused, and substituted an alternative mechanism of injury 
on his behalf. 
Upon the undisputed finding that Mondragon's allegations regarding how the 
alleged accident and injury occurred had been disproved, the ALJ inferred that he must 
have been confused about how the accident occurred. The ALJ stated that "[t]his Court 
finds it easy to believe that people can be hurt and that they may be confused about the 
'mechanism of injury' .... If Mr. Mondragon has a flawed recollection of the details of 
the injury . . . the case can be made that an accident took place from the facts known 
before and after the moment of injury."16 
The ALJ stated that although Mondragon's accident description was "flawed in 
the details," she found Mondragon's testimony regarding his work day-namely, that he 
was working quickly with a wheelbarrow of which he lost control and it tipped-"to be 
believable and truthful," and that "Mondragon felt a pop in the knee."17 Building upon 
the assumption that Mondragon must have been confused, the ALJ found that it was 
"quite clear" that Mondragon "use[ d] his legs and body to try and keep control of the 
14 /d. 
15 R. at 75. 
16 R. at 118; see "Addendum B." 
17 Id.; R. at 120. 
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wheel barrow and when the heavy load tipped he and the wheel barrow [were] jerked and 
tousled." 18 In making that new finding, the ALJ did not identify any evidentiary support 
therefor. Notably, neither Mondragon's unequivocal testimony nor his in-court 
demonstration presented support for a finding that he attempted to maintain control of the 
tipping wheelbarrow. 
Upon JP's appeal to the Labor Commission, the Commission adopted the ALJ's 
assumption that Mondragon must have been confused about how the injury occurred. 19 
Affirming that the mechanism alleged by Mondragon could not have occurred, the 
Commission noted that "even though Mr. Mondragon did not twist his right knee 
between the wheelbarrow handles, he may have twisted or damaged his right knee in 
another way."20 Similar to the ALJ, the Commission found that "it is not uncommon for 
an injured worker to be confused with regard to the specific action that results in an 
internal injury."21 Also like the ALJ, and although it identified no evidentiary support for 
such a conclusion, the Commission stated that "established by the record is that Mr. 
Mondragon's right knee was subject to stress while the fully loaded wheelbarrow tipped 
over."22 
Finding that the medical panel assigned by the ALJ based its finding of medical 
causation (which the ALJ had adopted in awarding benefits) upon Mondragon's 
disproved twisting allegation, the Commission remanded the matter to the ALJ with 
18 R. at 118. 
19 R. at 144. 
20 R. at 144 (emphasis added). 
21 R. at 144. 
22 R. at 144. 
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instructions to have the panel consider the alternative theory that Mondragon's injury was 
caused by the stress to which his knee was supposedly subject "while holding a full 
wheelbarrow that tipped over."23 Upon remand back to the medical panel, further factual 
assumptions were made that were again adopted in awarding benefits. 
Although the panel was instructed that it is bound by the facts found by the 
Commission, the panel proceeded to conduct its own factual investigation, and adopted 
its own findings in support of its conclusion.24 In so doing, the panel made additional 
assumptions, reportedly based upon conversation with Mondragon, that Mondragon 
"tried to plant his feet to stabilize the wheelbarrow," and that in "trying to hold the 
wheelbarrow from tipping . . . he straightened or bent his knee under considerable 
abnormal stress."25 Characterizing the mechanism as being a "violent stressful motion 
type injury," the panel again concluded that Mondragon's knee was injured by the (now 
materially different) industrial accident.26 
It is clear that the purpose of medical panels before the Commission is limited to 
medical examination and diagnosis. 27 A medical panel is not permitted to "encroach upon 
the authority vested in the Commission to make the findings of fact."28 However, in 
conducting its own "investigation," and adopting the additional "facts" pertaining to the 
injury, the panel did exactly that-going beyond the Commission's own unsupported 
23 R. at 144. 
24 R. at 149 (instructing the panel that it is bound by the findings of fact); R. at 152. 
25 R. at 152-53. 
26 R. at 153. 
27 lntermountain Healthcare v. Bd. of Rev. of Indus. Comm 'n, 839 P.2d 841, 845 n.5 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
2s 1d. 
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inferences regarding Mondragon's "stress" and compounding the same with its own 
assertions of how such stress may have occurred.29 Nonetheless, without taking issue 
therewith, the ALJ issued a cursory order adopting the panel's conclusions (and thereby, 
its improper and inadmissible factual assertions upon which its conclusions were based) 
and affirmed her prior award of benefits to Mondragon. 30 
Upon JP's second appeal, the Commission expanded its prior finding to state that 
"the record does show that [Mondragon's] right knee was subject to significant stress" as 
a result of the wheelbarrow tipping, and adopted the medical panel's opinion of medical 
causation.31 Affirming the ALJ's Order, the Commission concluded that "[a]lthough Mr. 
Mondragon's mistaken description of exactly how his work injury occurred presented a 
challenge in adjudicating his claim, his mistake was not fatal to his claim because the 
underlying and dispositive circumstances of the accident were established in the record 
even though the precise mechanism of injury was not."32 
29 The policies behind prohibiting panels from attempting to find their own facts are 
plainly evident, and are implicated in this case. When additional "facts" are found by a 
panel-especially when they are contrary to the evidence established during the 
hearing-respondents have no way of determining the veracity of such facts, and are 
robbed of the opportunity to challenge and/or develop the same through cross 
examination. 
30 R. at 159. 
31 R. at 203-04 (emphasis added); see "Addendum C." 
32 R. at 204. 
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B. The inference that that Mondragon was confused was unreasonable 
and unsupported. 
As the finder of fact, the Labor Commission is required to view all the evidence as 
a whole, and then make an appropriate determination of the facts established thereby.33 
The Commission may draw reasonable inferences from the facts established at hearing, 
but it may not base its award of benefits upon an arbitrary choice between two equally 
reasonable inferences. "If, therefore, two different inferences may be deduced, one of 
which authorizes the award and the other not, and both inferences are equally reasonable, 
the Commission may not arbitrarily disregard one of the inferences and choose the other. 
In such circumstances the inferences meet and destroy each other, and neither has any 
probative force or effect. "34 If the Commission makes an award on the basis of such a 
choice between inferences, the award is improper as it lacks support in the evidence and 
is unlawful as it creates liability without any legal evidence in support thereof. 35 
Here, as presented above, the ALJ and Commission's award of benefits to 
Mondragon is premised upon their adoption of the inference that because Mondragon's 
story was disproved, he must have been confused or mistaken about how it happened. 
This inference was adopted to the exclusion of the opposing inference that Mondragon's 
story was not a product of confusion or mistake, but fabrication. Although the 
33 Johnston v. Labor Comm 'n, 2013 UT App 179 ,i 24, 307 P.3d 615 ("It is the province 
of the [Commission], as the finder of fact, to view all the evidence submitted as a whole 
and then make an appropriate determination."). 
34 Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Indus. Comm 'n, 58 Utah 608, 614, 201 P. 173, 175 (Utah 
1921). 
35 Id. 
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Commission asserted that support for its assumptions and ultimate award exists in the 
record, this is not the case. 
The question is, given the available evidence, was there sufficient support for the 
assumption that Mondragon was confused, or was it equally reasonable to infer that 
Mondragon's story was fabricated and could not support an award of benefits? There is in 
fact, no evidence of confusion and JP's contends that based upon the available evidence, 
and the evidence JP's sought to obtain on the veracity of Mondragon's claim, it was 
actually more reasonable to reject Mondragon's story as a fabrication and find that no 
accident occurred. 
The Commission asserted that its award was proper since the underlying factual 
bases were evident from the record. The Commission contended that "[ w ]hile the exact 
mechanism of injury is somewhat uncertain ... it is not uncommon for an injured worker 
to be unclear about a specific exertion that leads to an internal injury ... the record does 
show that his right knee was subject to significant stress while carrying a fully loaded 
wheelbarrow that tipped over. "36 However, the record is devoid of evidence pertaining to 
"significant stress" upon Mondragon' s knee. 37 
In determining that the tip-over event caused "significant stress" the Commission 
assumed the existence of facts not in evidence pertaining to Mondragon's assumed efforts 
to stop the wheelbarrow from tipping. Although it may be assumed that a person might 
36 R. at 203 (internal quotes omitted). 
37 JP's does not dispute that Mondragon was working with a wheelbarrow on the date of 
the accident, and that his knee would have been subject to some level of stress imposed 
by normally operating such a device-but Mondragon never asserted that such stress 
caused the injury. 
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try to regain control of a tipping wheelbarrow, Mondragon made no such allegation in 
this matter, and submitted no evidence in support of such a finding. Instead, Mondragon's 
presentation of evidence was offered solely in support of his single unchanging allegation 
that his knee was injured when it was caught and twisted between the handles of the 
falling wheelbarrow.38 
Mondragon made no allegation that he expended any effort whatsoever to prevent 
the wheelbarrow from tipping. He simply alleged that when the wheelbarrow "tipped to 
the side" the handles caught and twisted his knee, causing the injury.39 Mondragon's 
testimony stands in stark contrast to the ultimate findings adopted by the Commission, 
which relied upon the presence of significant effort by Mondragon to regain control of 
the tipping wheelbarrow. 40 It was unreasonable for the Commission to assume the 
existence of significant stress during the supposed injury event when the circumstances 
and Mondragon's testimony did not support such an inference. 
However, and more importantly, without first making the assumption that 
Mondragon was confused or mistaken, the Commission could not have reached the 
assumption of the alternative "significant stress" theory of injury. Mondragon's 
testimony shows that he was not confused or mistaken. Instead, Mondragon presented his 
38 R. 221 at 
39 R. 221 at 20: 18-25. 
40 As noted above, this inference of "significant effort" was largely created by the 
medical panel through its improper intrusion into the fact finding authority of the ALJ, 
wherein it unilaterally accepted as true its assumptions that Mondragon made significant 
efforts to prevent the wheelbarrow from tipping, and based its conclusions upon the 
same. 
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story in a clear and unequivocal manner, with no indication that he was unsure, or that he 
couldn't remember how the injury occurred. 
Mondragon testified briefly, but in a detailed and specific manner about the 
alleged mechanism during his direct testimony. Although Mondragon appeared pro se, 
the ALJ handled his direct testimony in a question and answer format, eliciting the details 
about the alleged accident which she deemed important to his claim. In responding to the 
ALJ's questions, Mondragon testified that the wheelbarrow "tipped to the side and it 
caught his knee. Which knee? This one, the right one. The handles caught in my knee. 
Tell me what happened then. Okay, so my knee was caught between the two handles-
handles, and I felt my knee popping."41 Likewise on cross examination, Mondragon was 
unwavering, testifying that one handle caught the outside of his right leg, above the knee, 
and the other caught the inside, three to four inches below the knee, and "when both 
handles-when my knee was between both handles, my bone popped."42 
The Commission stated that it is "not uncommon" for injured workers to be 
unclear or mistaken about the mechanism of their injury. JP's does not dispute that this is 
likely the case. Indeed, if Mondragon would have indicated that he was confused about, 
or that he couldn't remember exactly how the accident happened, JP's would likely agree 
to the propriety of assuming that an injury occurred just based upon the allegations that 
he was working and something happened with the wheelbarrow that caused him injury. 
Such is not the case here. Mondragon presented a uniform and very specific story, which 
41 R. 221 at 14: 17-25. 
42 R. 221 at 24: 2-16. 
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ultimately was shown to be false. The simple fact that he was wrong, does not necessarily 
lead to the assumption that he was confused. 
JP's contends that Mondragon presented a fabricated story in order to obtain a 
fraudulent award of benefits. However, as addressed below, JP's was prevented from 
obtaining necessary evidence on that issue, which may have resulted in referral of this 
case for a fraud investigation. In any event, it is not surprising that Mondragon chose the 
accident theory he presented to the Commission. At first blush, it does appear to be 
possible and sounds to be quite traumatic in nature-likely consistent, from a lay-
perspective, with a knee injury such as Mondragon's. Even the ALJ, prior to the physical 
demonstration that proved its impossibility, stated that she had no problem visualizing the 
event, noting "I can see how this could happen. I've had a wheelbarrow tip on me .... 
It's not at all difficult to understand."43 Nonetheless, upon demonstration, Mondragon's 
story was disproved and he offered no indication that he was confused, mistaken, or that 
some alternative mechanism existed. 
The Commission contends that its assumption of confusion and assertion of an 
alternative accident theory is reasonable due to its acceptance as true that Mondragon was 
working with a wheelbarrow that tipped, reported an injury, and received timely medical 
treatment.44 Again, JP's does not dispute that Mondragon was working with the 
wheelbarrow, or that he offered a subjective report of popping and injury. These facts 
make it no more or less likely that he was confused versus lying. The timely medical 
43 R. 221 at 24: 20-25; 25: 1-5. 
44 R. at 203 (noting these are the circumstances upon which the prior decisions from the 
ALJ and Commission were based). 
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treatment upon which the Commission relies actually supports the argument that 
Mondragon had the knee injury before he began his employment at JP's. 
On the date of the accident, Mondragon was seen by Dr. Britt.45 On inspection, Dr. 
Britt found the knee to be "normal in appearance" with "no visible bruising."46 Dr. Britt 
did note some tenderness, and that "[t]here may be slight swelling above the joint line 
medially," and assessed a right knee sprain.47 Thus, at the medical examination most 
contemporaneous to the accident, which should have yielded the most evidence in 
support of this alleged "significant" mechanism and injury, Mondragon's knee appeared 
normal in appearance. There was possibly slight swelling present, however, in describing 
the nature of symptoms in individuals with chronic meniscal injuries, the medical panel 
noted that "[r]ecurrent swelling is the rule not the exception."48 Thus, it is equally likely 
that if there was slight swelling present on exam, it may have been recurrent from a prior 
injury, as opposed to acutely caused by an accident at JP's. 
JP's contends that the opposite assumption is more reasonable when the opposing 
evidence is considered. JP's identified that evidence to the Commission, including the 
fact that Mondragon was allegedly injured within hours of starting his employment with 
JP's,49 through an alleged accident that was unwitnessed and that proved to be physically 
impossible. Mondragon's prolific and questionable claims history whereby he and his 
adult son demonstrated a history of multiple prior claims at the same successive 
45 R. 220 at 30. 
46 Jd. 
47 Id. 
48 R. at 153. 
49 R. 221 at 20:10. 
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employers is further support for viewing Mondragon's claim with skepticism.50 Likewise, 
following the alleged injury with JP's, and without receiving any substantive treatment 
for his alleged knee condition, Mondragon demonstrated the ability to return to heavy 
labor work like that performed at JP's, which supports inference that he was capable of 
beginning work with JP's notwithstanding a then-current injury.51 
Although JP's contends that there is no evidentiary support for the inference of 
confusion, and ample support for the opposite inference, at minimum the two inferences 
must be viewed as equally reasonable as being the two possible explanations for 
Mondragon's false story. The Commission is prohibited from arbitrarily choosing to 
believe that Mondragon was confused in order to award benefits.52 Nonetheless, that is 
precisely what occurred. Because the available inferences are, at minimum, equally 
reasonable, neither may be adopted as a basis for an order as they are deemed to lack 
evidentiary support.53 
Because the inferences that Mondragon was either confused or lying "meet and 
destroy each other," we are left with the simple undisputed fact that Mondragon pled and 
relied upon an accident theory that did not occur. In so doing, Mondragon failed to prove 
the first necessary element of his accident claim-that the industrial accident did in fact 
so R. at 180-198. 
51 R. at 201; see also R. 200 at 64, p.2 (discussing Mondragon's subsequent 
employment). 
52 Spring Canyon Coal Co., 58 Utah at 614. 
53 Jd. 
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occur.54 Mondragon's claim should have been dismissed at that time, and the 
Commission erred in failing to do so. This Court should remedy that error. 
C. The alternative theory of Mondragon 's accident lacks medical 
support and therefore does not satisfy medical causation. 
To sustain an award of benefits, an injured worker must prove that the accident is 
the medical cause of his injury. 55 Such a showing requires that the worker prove that his 
injury is medically caused by the workplace accident.56 Medical causation is an issue of 
fact, and the Commission's determination will be upheld only if it is adequately 
supported by the record. 57 Here, as outlined above, Mondragon did not assert the accident 
theory upon which his award was ultimately based, and did not proffer evidence or 
argument in support thereof. In any event, if the errors in presenting and adopting the 
alternative accident theory are overlooked, it nonetheless fails to meet the requirements 
of medical causation. 
The treatment records in evidence, upon which Mondragon relied as medical 
support for his claim, document that they were all premised upon the existence of the 
twisting mechanism alleged by Mondragon. In the first treatment record, Dr. Britt details 
the mechanism upon which his examination and diagnosis are based. He documents that 
Mondragon reported that his knee was injured when "pushing a wheelbarrow ... and as 
the wheelbarrow tilted, the handles to[ ok] hold [ ofJ him in different directions" which 
54 Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401(1) (requiring proof of an injury "by accident"). 
55 Allen v. Indus. Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15, 25 (Utah 1986). 
56 Chase v. Indus. Comm 'n, 872 P.2d 475, 479 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
51 Id. 
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caused pressure on and a pop in the knee. 58 Likewise, the other treating physician, Dr. 
Andruss, documented that his care was also based upon Mondragon's allegations. His 
record demonstrates that Mondragon reported that the "wheelbarrow fell," trapping his 
right knee in a "rotation type injury."59 
None of the medical records were premised upon the "significant stress" theory 
ultimately put forth and adopted by the ALJ and Commission. Instead, all Mondragon's 
treatment and recommendations were based upon his report to the physicians that his 
knee had been twisted between the handles of the falling wheelbarrow. Because that 
theory was disproved, Mondragon' s medical support for that theory was invalidated and 
he lacked medical support for any other theory of accident. Nonetheless, the ALJ 
determined that conflicting medical opinions regarding medical causation existed, and 
referred the matter to the medical panel for evaluation.60 Upon JP's challenge of the 
referral, the Commission concluded that "there was sufficient evidence of a work injury 
and conflicting opinions with regard to its medical cause to refer the issue to a medical 
panel."61 
JP's does not dispute that the medical records initially demonstrated a dispute as to 
the medical cause of Mondragon's injury. However, that dispute was premised wholly 
upon the presumption of Mondragon's physicians that the mechanism he reported had 
actually occurred. Because Mondragon's reported mechanism did not occur, those same 
58 R. 220 at 30. 
59 R. 220 at 52. 
60 R. at 76. 
61 R. at 203. 
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medical records were rendered foundationless and cannot be relied upon as support for an 
alternative accident theory which the physicians did not consider in reaching their 
conclusions. 
Although the medical panel ultimately provided support for the ALJ and 
Commission's alternative accident theory, such support cannot be relied upon as it was 
obtained through an improper referral and, as explained above, an improper medical 
panel process wherein the panel adopted its own new "facts" as the basis for its opinions. 
The Labor Commission's rules mandate that to qualify for submission to a medical panel, 
a significant medical dispute must be present that is demonstrated by "[ c ]onflicting 
medical opinions related to causation of the injury or disease."62 In short, the medical 
panel cannot create medical support where none exists, but can only weigh-in on disputes 
already in evidence. 
Here, there was no medical dispute regarding whether the alternative accident 
theory was the medical cause of Mondragon's injuries, because the medical evidence in 
the record wholly failed to address such a mechanism. In referring the matter to the 
medical panel, the ALJ and Commission improperly shoehorned the existing medical 
evidence to fit their substitute theory, and proceeded to rely upon the medical panel to 
create the only medical evidence in support thereof. This circular method is a 
fundamentally improper use of the medical panel as its function is not to create medical 
62 Utah Admin. Code R602-2-2(A). 
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support or disputes, but to address conflicts between already existing medical evidence.63 
Because no medical support existed for the alternative accident theory, there was no 
justification for a referral to the medical panel to obtain the same. The Commission's 
decision, based upon the Panel's conclusion that the alternative accident theory caused 
Mondragon's injury, is therefore improper and cannot be upheld. Mondragon's claim 
should have been dismissed for failure to establish medical causation. 
II. JP's was improperly denied discovery into the veracity of 
Mondragon's claim. 
Discovery in workers' compensation cases permits the parties to inquire into all 
matters "relevant to the claims and defenses at issue in the case."64 As alluded to above, 
during the discovery process, JP' s attempted to obtain additional evidence on whether 
Mondragon's claim was fraudulent in nature. In conducting our preliminary investigation 
into Mondragon's claim history, a claims history report was generated which included a 
broad search to discover any aliases, misspellings, similar names, etc.65 Upon receipt of 
that report, it became apparent to JP's that Mondragon and his adult son had 
demonstrated a pattern of filing numerous prior workers' compensation claims at the 
same successive prior employers. 
The claims pattern evidenced by the report, based upon the claims professional's 
and counsel's wealth of experience in reviewing such reports, raised credible suspicion of 
63 See Martinez v. Dakota Mills & Cabinets, 2008 UT Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 9, 4 (Feb 22, 
2008 Order Affirming ALJ's Decision, Case No. 06-0972) (Labor Commission 
acknowledging that a medical panel cannot be used to create medical evidence or 
disputes where none exists). 
64 Utah Admin. Code R. 602-2-l(F)(l). 
65 R. at 179-98. 
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fraud. This, combined with the facts that Mondragon was allegedly injured within hours 
of beginning his employment with JP's in an unwitnessed accident, and had demonstrated 
the ability to work notwithstanding the alleged injury through his return to similar 
employment, led JP's to seek additional discovery in an effort to determine whether a 
referral of Mondragon' s claim for a fraud investigation was indicated. 
JP's notified the Labor Commission of our suspicion of fraud early in the 
discovery process, 66 and submitted requests to Mondragon for authorization from his 
adult son and wife to obtain records pertaining to their claims history. 67 Mondragon 
refused to respond to JP's discovery efforts, and in ruling on JP's Motion to Compel, the 
ALJ refused to allow discovery regarding Mondragon's wife and son, stating that there 
had been no showing of relevancy and that the court lacked jurisdiction.68 
Although JP's did have a strong suspicion of fraud in this case, it is not common 
practice to turn over cases to the Attorney General's office for investigation without 
substantial evidence of the same. Due to the ALJ's refusal to allow further discovery on 
the issue, JP's was unable to obtain that evidence. However, because it became apparent 
to JP's that Mondragon's alleged mechanism of injury was impossible, JP's proceeded on 
that defense as the lack of proof an accident alone should have been sufficient to obtain a 
dismissal ofMondragon's claim 
Upon receiving the ALJ's and Commission's Orders, which assumed confusion 
and created a new theory of accident not asserted or supported by Mondragon, JP's again 
66 R. at 23. 
67 R. at 28. 
68 R. at 63. 
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argued that the discovery which it initially sought on credibility and fraud was wholly 
relevant, now more than before, and that it must now be allowed.69 In denying JP's 
Motion for a remand to allow the discovery, the Commission stated that JP's had 
submitted "no actual evidence of fraud on Mr. Mondragon's part," and that "JP's 
assertion that Mr. Mondragon is not credible and may be committing fraud is no more 
than speculation without evidence of actual fraud."70 
JP's contends that the Commission's ruling amounts to an abuse of discretion. 
Essentially, in denying JP's request for discovery, the Commission held that because JP's 
had not submitted the very evidence on fraud and credibility that JP 's sought to obtain 
through the requested discovery, it would not remand to allow the necessary discovery. It 
simultaneously prevented JP's from obtaining the necessary evidence on fraud and 
credibility while penalizing JP' s for not obtaining and submitting the same. It is the 
speculation of fraud, based upon the circumstantial evidence outlined above, that JP's 
sought to support through the requested discovery. Although the Commission deemed 
appropriate to base its decision upon speculation, it dismissed JP's speculation of fraud as 
insufficient to even justify further discovery to develop the facts thereof. Nonetheless, 
JP's speculation of fraud casts additional doubt upon the Commission's assumption of 
Mondragon' s confusion. -The Commission's decision lacks foundation in logic and 
deprived JP's of its rights to conduct discovery into this centrally relevant matter. This 
Court should, at minimum, correct the Commission's improper ruling on this issue. 
69 R. at 207. 
70 R. at 21 7; see "Addendum D." 
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III. The ALJ and Commission improperly advocated on Mondragon's 
behalf in creating a new theory of accident. 
Utah's approach to pro se litigants "seeks to balance the procedural demands of 
litigation and the rights of unrepresented parties."71 Thus, while an occasional 
"procedural misstep" may be tolerated without sanction, an unrepresented party is "held 
to the same standard of knowledge and practice as any qualified member of the bar" and 
it is impermissible for the court to advocate on their behalf.72 Ultimately, "if a litigant, for 
whatever reason, sees fit to rely on himself as counsel, he must be prepared to accept the 
consequences of his mistakes and errors."73 This Court has further confirmed that it is 
improper for the Commission to enter an award based upon an accident theory not pled or 
presented by the applicant. 74 
Here, the Commission made clear that because of Mondragon's pro se status, it 
was willing to overlook the so-called "mistakes" in his claim. The Commission 
documented its theory that "an injured worker, especially one who is unrepresented like 
Mr. Mondragon, may make a mistake regarding an aspect of his or her claim" and that 
the Commission could nonetheless remedy that mistake for him based upon its view of 
the evidence. Where, as here, Mondragon's "mistake" was to concoct an impossible 
theory of how he was injured in order to receive workers' compensation benefits, JP's 
contends that such a mistake cannot be overlooked. Nor can it be remedied, sua sponte, 
71 State v. Burdick, 2014 UT App 34, ,r 25, 320 P.3d 55. 
72 Id. 
73 Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1220 (Hall, Chief Justice: concurring and 
dissenting opinion) (Utah 1983). 
74 Acosta v. Labor Comm 'n, 2002 UT App 67, ,r,r 31-33, 44 P.3d 819. 
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by the Commission. In asserting an alternate theory of accident on behalf of Mondragon, 
the Commission crossed into prohibited advocacy in violation of JP's due process rights. 
As has been thoroughly established above, Mondragon's sole allegation regarding 
his injury is that the handles of the falling wheelbarrow twisted and injured his right knee. 
Once that theory was disproved, Mondragon did not make a single effort to advocate in 
his own behalf-notwithstanding JP's challenges. Indeed, although JP's filed several 
motions, objections, and appeals before the Labor Commission, not once did Mondragon 
respond. Instead, the ALJ and Commission, acting on their own volition, stepped in to 
assert that not only was Mondragon confused about how the accident must have 
happened (although he gave no indication of confusion) but to assert an alternative 
accident theory on his behalf (which Mondragon never raised or supported). 
In Acosta, this Court held that it is error for the Commission to base an award 
upon an accident theory not asserted by the applicant, but instead by the ALJ.75 The 
applicant in Acosta had relied solely upon an accident theory involving one specific 
instance of lifting an eight pound baby from its crib as being the cause of her injury.76 
The ALJ acknowledged that the one specific lift relied upon by the applicant would not 
support an award of benefits, and then proceeded, sua sponte, relying upon his view of 
the evidence in the case, to expand the applicant's accident theory to include 40 lifts 
75 Acosta, 2002 UT App 67, ,i,i 31-33. 
76 Id. at 33. 
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throughout the day, along with other various exertions, and found that the same were 
sufficient to justify an award. 77 
On review below, the Commission reversed the award to Acosta, holding that the 
applicant had "relied on a single, specific work activity" as the cause for her injury, and 
that it was "inappropriate for either the ALJ or the Commission to raise other theories ... 
to justify an award of benefits."78 This Court, on appeal, agreed that the Commission 
acted correctly in reversing the award, holding that it was "improper" for the ALJ to raise 
the expanded theory of the accident on its own, because it denied the respondents the 
opportunity to defend against the new theory. 79 Holding that because the applicant failed 
to raise the alternative accident theory on her own, she could not rely upon it, this Court 
affirmed the denial of benefits.80 
In asserting the alternative "significant stress" theory of accident for Mondragon, 
the Commission deprived JP's of the opportunity to defend against the same. 
Mondragon's allegations regarding the accident, as detailed above, consistently pointed 
only at the twisting-between-the-wheelbarrow-handles mechanism. As detailed above, 
Monragon' s reports in the medical evidence were likewise consistent with his single 
theory of accident. JP's had no notice or reason to prepare a defense based upon some 
alternative theory that was neither asserted by Mondragon nor supported by the evidence. 
Nonetheless, just as the ALJ did in Acosta, the Commission and ALJ here presented, sua 
77 Id. at 31. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 33. 
so Id. 
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sponte, an alternative theory of accident which Mondragon did not raise or support, and 
premised its award of benefits thereupon. Like the award in Acosta, the Commission's 
award here is improper. 
The Commission asserted that it was not improper for it to "advance an alternative 
theory of the accident," since it was well-established in the records. To the contrary, as 
shown above, there exists no evidentiary support for the "significant stress" theory put 
forth by the Commission. In any event, JP's contends that whatever level of leniency is 
afforded to pro se litigants, the Commission exceeded that grant in stepping into the 
shoes of Mondragon's counsel by asserting alternative accident theories on his behalf 
which formed the basis for its award. The Commission did not overlook some minor 
procedural misstep. Instead, it excused Mondragon from his obligation to prove a 
necessary element of his claim and improperly awarded benefits on a theory which 
Mondragon did not assert, the evidence did not support, and against which JP' s had no 
opportunity to defend. The Commission's actions were improper and should not be 
allowed to form the basis for a finding of liability against JP's. 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission's award of benefits in this matter cannot be upheld as it is based 
upon inference and assumption not founded in the evidence, and upon improper actions 
by the Commission on Mondragon's behalf. Upon completion of the evidentiary hearing, 
all facts in this matter, including Mondragon's own pleadings, testimony, demonstration, 
and the medical evidence, pointed only to the twisting mechanism alleged by Mondragon. 
Once that mechanism was disproved, the Commission assumed, without evidentiary 
35 
support, that Mondragon was confused and based thereupon proceeded, sua sponte, to 
create an alternate accident theory and improperly relied upon the medical panel to 
provide support therefor. In the process, JP' s was deprived of the opportunity to defend 
against the Commission's new theory, including through completion of relevant 
discovery. The Commission's award is contrary to the evidence in record and is a product 
of improper actions on Mondragon' s behalf by the ALJ and Commission. It cannot be 
allowed to stand. This Court should reverse. 
-::---
DATED this __ /(_day of_,,,,....Li+-'-~---' 2016 
'-' 
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER NELSON 
A ~ 
C~er 
Attorneys for Appellants, JBS USA LLC and/or 
American Zurich Ins. Co; Zurich American Ins. 
Co. 
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A. Transcript of the June 12, 2013 evidentiary hearing. [R. 221.] 
B. Findings of Pact, Conclusions of Law, and Order. [R. at 117-23.] 
C. Order Affirming ALJ's Decision. [R. at 200-06.] 
D. Order Denying Request for Reconsideration. [R. at 216-19.] 
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For Petitioner: 
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Telephone: 801-531-2000 
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Witness Page 
ALBERTO MONDRAGON 
Examination by the Court 
Cross-Examination by Mr. Kesler 
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l June 12~ 2013 9:00 a.m. 
2 P R O C E E D I N G S 
3 THE COURT: I'll call to order (tape skipped} 
4 JP's Landscaping and/or Auto Owners Insurance Company. 
5 This is Labor Commission case No. 12-0664. It's 
6 June 12, 2013, approximately 9:00 a.m. This is the 
7 date and time set for the hearing in this matter. 
8 Would counsel for Respondents please state 
9 his appearance? 
10 MR. KESLER: Cody Kesler, and that's 
11 K-E-S-L-E-R. 
12 THE COURT: Thank you, sir. Will 
13 Mr. Mondragon be representing himself today? 
14 
15 
MR. MONDRAGON: Oh-huh. 
THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to first swear 
16 you as my interpreter, so if you could come and stand 
17 here at the podium. 
18 
19 
Would you state your name? 
INTERPRETER: Patty McCoy, M-C-C-O-Y, 
20 P-A-T-T-Y. 
21 THE COURT: Ma'am, would you please raise 
22 your right hand? 
23 Do you swear that you will fully and truly, 
24 to the best of your ability, interpret the English 
25 language to the Spanish language and the Spanish 
3 
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1 language to the English language in today's 
2 proceeding? 
3 
4 
INTERPRETER: I do. 
THE COURT: Thank you. And please, if we 
5 talk too fast or you're having a hard time, just raise 
6 your hand--
INTEPRETER: Okay. 7 
8 THE COURT: --and we'll stop and--and let you 
9 get caught up. I want Mr. Mondragon to know 
10 everything that's going on. 
11 
12 
INTERPRETER: Thank you. 
THE COURT: I think there are--is at least 
13 one preliminary evidentiary history--item regarding 
14 the medical records exhibit. Is that right, 
15 Mr. Kesler? 
MR. KESLER: That's correct. 16 
17 THE COURT: Would you like me to take that up 
18 at this time? 
19 
20 
21 
MR. KESLER: Please. 
THE COURT: Okay. What is it? 
MR. KESLER: Yes. Just this morning--a few 
22 months--well, let's see, on May 1st, Mr. Mondragon was 
23 seen by Cr. Fotheringham for an IME. And we were in 
24 communication to Dr. Fotheringham for the past couple 
25 of days. We just received his report at 8:30 this 
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1 morning, as it was faxed here. We have copies of that 
2 now. 
3 I'm happy to--you know, if we can take a 
4 recess and let Mr. Mondragon review it with the 
5 interpreter, so that he's aware of--of the findings of 
6 the report, that--
7 THE COURT: I thought that would already have 
8 been done. That's why we (inaudible). 
9 
10 
M~. KESLER: It happens. 
THE COURT: Yes, you need to give 
11 Mr. Mondragon a copy . 
12 MR. KESLER: Here's a copy of this. And--and 
13 may I approach? 
14 THE COURT: Yes. This is the report from 
15 Dr. Fotheringham that saw you for the insurance 
16 company. It's being proposed that it be added to the 
17 medical records. Do you object to that being added to 
18 the records? 
19 
20 
THE WITNESS: Yes, you can add them. 
THE COURT: Okay. Where I propose to add 
21 them would be at the end, which would make this page 
22 64, consecutively to the end. Does anyone have a 
23 com.~ent on that numbering? 
24 
25 
MR. KESLER: That appears appropriate. 
THE COURT: Okay. So starting with page 64. 
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1 I am not going to take time to number each page right 
2 now. I'll have my clerk do it later. 
3 With the addition of this record, do you know 
4 of any other additions, deletions or modifications 
5 that need to be made to the medical records exhibit, 
6 Mr. Kesler? 
7 MR. KESLER: No, just the record from 
8 Dr. Fotheringham was all that I had additional. 
9 THE COURT: Ask Mr. Mondragon if he has seen 
10 the medical records exhibit . 
11 THE WITNESS: Yes. One was sent to me, but 
12 because I can't read English, then I did not read it. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. Does he have any objection 
14 to this coming into evidence as Joint Exhibit l? 
15 THE WITNESS: Yes, I--I agree that it has to 
16 be added. 
17 THE COORT: Okay. Then this will be marked 
18 Joint Exhibit 1 and become part of the evidentiary 
19 record. And that's with the addition of the report at 
20 the end . 
21 Mr. Mondragon, have you ever participated in 
22 a hearing or proceeding such as'this, or seen one? 
23 THE WITNESS: No. 
24 THE COURT: The way we proceed is it's your 
25 case, so you have to prove your case. You can do that 
6 
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1 by testifying, calling witnesses, and/or sometimes 
2 just relying on the medical records. You'll get a 
3 chance to make an opening statement to tell me what 
4 your case is about, briefly, and then the other side 
5 can make an opening statement. And then we'll 
6 actually put on evidence. Anyone that testifies will 
7 be placed under oath and will have to be cross-
8 examined. 
9 At the end of the proceeding, you get to make 
10 a closing argument. And because it's your case and 
11 you have the burden of proof, you get to make a final 
12 rebuttal closing argument, too. You get the first and 
13 last word. 
14 
15 
THE WITNESS: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: Would Mr. Mondragon like to make 
16 an opening statement at this time? 
17 
18 
THE WITNESS: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: Okay. And you can stand, sit, 
19 come up, it's whatever you're comfortable with. 
20 THE WITNESS: Yes. I just wanted to let you 
21 know that the insurance, maybe for about a year now, 
22 has not approved anything to have my leg checked. 
23 Yes. It was for about one year that I had rny--that my 
24 knee was fractured and I was in a lot of pain, and I 
25 never was able to see a doctor or get any medication. 
7 
' j 
l 
J 
1 THE COURT: Is there anything else he would 
2 like to say at this time? 
3 THE WITNESS: Yes. And because they would 
4 not have me go see a doctor and I needed to work, then 
5 I still had to go and get a job and work, even with my 
6 injured knee. And I am the only one who works at 
7 home. My wife doesn't work, she's not well. And if I 
8 didn't work, even in these conditions, then no one--I 
9 would not be able to support my family. 
10 THE COURT: Part of his claim is for missed 
11 days of work. Can he tell me how many days he was not 
12 able to work due to his knee, in his opinion? 
13 THE WITNESS: Okay. From the time of the 
14 injury until about July 15th, the doctor that saw me 
15 at the clinic checked my knee and told me that I could 
16 go back to work. The doctor gave me some paperwork to 
17 give to the employer so she could give me light duty. 
18 And the employer, instead of giving me light duty, she 
19 fired me. She told me that she had no light-duty work 
20 for me. 
21 And I don't know what your opinion would be 
22 on that, if that was right or wrong. I think she 
23 should have--the employer should have given me some 
24 
25 
light duty. 
THE COURT: So he was injured on May 22nd, 
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1 2012. So is he saying that he could not do anything 
2 but light duty from May 22nd, 2012 to July 15th, 2012? 
3 THE WITNESS: Okay. On that date, on July 
4 15th, the doctor told me that I could go back to work. 
5 She did not want to give me any light-duty work. But 
6 the doctor told me that I was disabled, but I still 
7 was able to go to work. And would you like to see 
8 this paperwork? 
9 
10 case. 
11 
THE COURT: He can make that part of his 
THE WITNESS: Oh-huh. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. Does he have anything else 
13 to say to me in an opening statement? 
14 THE WITNESS: Yes. And--well, that's it, 
15 except that I would like you to make sure that I get 
16 paid for those days, because I got injured at work, I 
17 didn't get injured at home. 
18 THE COURT: Okay. That's a good opening 
19 statement. And he has to then put on proof when 
20 it's--in a minute, but now we'll let Respondents make 
21 their opening statement. 
22 MR. KESLER: Thank you. In this--in this 
23 claim, Petitioner--he claims he sustained an injury on 
24 May 22nd, which was his first day of employment with 
25 this employer, when a wheelbarrow tipped over, the 
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1 opposing handles catching in his legs. There--there 
2 have been some issues with the description of the 
3 accident that we'll have to flesh out through 
examination today. 4 
5 
6 
7 
As Petitioner mentioned, the claim is for TTD 
from the date of injury to July 16th, 2012, which was 
his return to work date. Recommended medical, he 
8 claimed at the time of the application, was to be 
9 determined, but I'm assuming it would be per 
10 
11 
12 
Dr. Andrus's report. 
Petitioner mentioned he hasn't, in the last 
year, seen any treating physicians. Just in--in May 
13 of this year, May 7th, he was evaluated by Dr. Andrus 
14 for an orthopedic evaluation. 
15 Initially, this claim was denied due to 
16 
17 
18 
some--some difficulties in cooperation on the part of 
Petitioner in authorizing the adjuster in this matter 
to obtain medical records when she became aware of 
19 previous right-knee injuries. And so the denial was 
20 
21 
22 
subsequently issued on that ground. 
Based on the IME of Dr. Fotheringham that 
we--we just admitted, it's clear that this--the 
23 medical aspects of this case are going to have to go 
24 to a panel. Dr. Fotheringham states that it's not 
25 within a reasonable medical probability that 
10 
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1 Petitioner's current symptoms were due to the 
2 industrial accident, that the industrial accident was 
3 merely a temporary aggravation, and that ongoing 
4 treatment is not justified on the basis of the 
5 industrial accident. 
6 So the panel will have to evaluate causation, 
7 both initial and of the current symptoms, or at least 
8 after July 16th, 2012, when he was released, as well 
9 as future treatment. And as I mentioned, there are--
10 there are some--some issues with the mechanism of 
11 injury that we'll have to flesh out. But with that, 
12 we'll--we'll submit it to begin. 
13 THE COURT: Mr. Kesler--and I--I'm sorry, I 
14 usually leave a note here and I--I didn't. Are you 
15 opposing or did you deny the wage that was listed in 
16 the application? 
17 MR. KESLER: With the wage--as I mentioned, 
18 it was--
THE COURT: It's paragraph 6. 19 
20 MR. KESLER: --it was Petitioner's first day. 
21 The hourly wage we don't dispute. The--the weekly 
22 hours, I guess we just have to assume that it was 
23 going to be 40. We don't have--
24 
25 
THE COORT: So really, it's not in dispute? 
MR. KESLER: (Inaudible.) 
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1 THE COURT: So wage is not in dispute. It 
2 would be $12 an hour, 40 hours a week? 
3 
4 
MR. KESLER: Right. 
THE COURT: Do you agree with that, 
5 Mr. Mondragon? 
6 THE WITNESS: Yes. Yes, but r--I got injured 
7 the first day, but that's what he told me, that he was 
8 going to have me work 40 hours a week--
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
THE WITNESS: --at 12. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Mondragon, this 
is the time for you to put on your case. 
giving testimony under oath today? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
Will you be 
THE COURT: And that paper that you want me 
16 to have, why don't you bring that with you? And you 
17 can stand anywhere you'd like that makes it easier for 
18 you. 
19 Mr. Mondragon, if you'll come here and raise 
20 your right hand. I can take·the paper. Thank you . 
21 
22 
23 
(The witness was sworn.) 
THE WITNESS: Uh-huh. Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. We need to 
24 record everything, so speak out loud. The microphone 
25 won't make your voice louder, it just records. I'd 
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1 like you to have a seat here while you testify. And I 
2 will mark this paper as Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. 
3 
4 
Mr. Kesler, do you want to come look at this? 
You probably have already seen '-1-J_ :.. • Looks like the 
5 initial summary from his first visit. 
6 MR. KESLER: Yeah, that should be--let me 
7 just verify. That should be in the medical records 
8 exhibit. 
9 
10 
11 
THE COURT: It might be, so ... 
MR. KESLER: Let me just check that. 
THE COURT: All right. Go ahead and have a 
12 seat here. 
13 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honor, if it's okay 
14 with the Court, may I just roll that chair over here? 
15 
16 
17 to--
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
with 
THE COURT: You certainly can. 
THE INTERPRETER: It will be easier for me 
THE COURT: Yes. 
THE INTERPRETER: --connect with him. 
THE COURT: Mr. Kesler, do you mind helping 
setting up--
MR; KESLER: You bet. 
THE COURT: --this area? 
MR. KESLER: Yes. Sorry. 
THE INTERPRETER: Thank you. 
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1 THE COURT: Thank you so much. I'd run down 
2 to do it, but then you'd all realize how short I am. 
3 
4 
5 
6 
ALBERTO MONDRAGON, 
having been first duly sworn, was 
examined and testified as follows: 
EXAMINATION 
7 BY THE COURT: 
8 Q Mr. Mondragon, could you tell me how the 
9 accident happened? 
10 A Okay. What happened at that time, we were 
11 using wheelbarrows to empty--no. We were emptying 
12 wheelbarrows that had gravel in it. And we wanted to 
13 finish the job really quickly, so he had us work 
14 really fast. Okay. 
15 So we were almost running as we were pushing 
16 the wheel--as we were--as we were pushing the--the 
17 wheelbarrow. And as I was emptying it, then it tipped 
18 to the side--tipped to the side and it caught his 
19 knee. 
20 Q Which knee? · 
21 A This one, the right one. The handles caught 
22 in my knee . 
Q Tell me what happened then. 23 
24 
25 
A Okay. So my knee was caught between the two 
handles--handles, and I felt my knee popping and 
14 
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1 twisting to the side. And right away this bone right 
2 here--this area right here was swelling. 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
THE COURT: You can--okay. He has pointed to 
the inside of his right knee is being an area that was 
swelling. 
THE WITNESS: And it was swollen. And this 
whole area right here--here, underneath it. 
Q 
A 
(By the Court) Front and back? 
Yes, this part right here--this area right 
10 here. I think~-it popped really hard and some--maybe 
11 
12 
only nerves got twisted. Okay. So then after that I 
went in to tell the--the employer about it, but she 
13 was not there . 
14 
15 
So then about ten minutes later she showed up 
and I told her that I had injured my knee. And she 
16 asked me if I wanted to go to the clinic and I said, 
17 ~Yes, I want to go to the clinic." And she just gave 
18 me her phone number and--and that's when I went. And 
19 the doctor whose name is written on that piece of 
20 paper was the one who saw me. 
21 And the doctor--when the doctor saw me, he 
22 
23 
24 
25 
told me that it was a severe sprain. And that's when 
the doctor gave me that paper and he said there were 
two of them, one for me and one for the employer. And 
then he told me that she was going to be able to read 
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1 what it said in there and that I was able to do work, 
2 but it had to be light duty. And that's when she told 
3 me that she had no light-duty work for me and that she 
4 --and then she fired me. 
5 And if I would-have had money, I would have 
6 hired an attorney. I know that when a doctor gives 
7 you a paper for light duty and they fire you right 
8 away, then--then that is not--that would be bad for 
9 them. She--she didn't follow or respected any of the 
10 suggestions the doctor gave her in that letter. It 
11 was not what I was saying, it's what the doctor was 
12 saying. 
13 Q Okay. What else would he like me to know 
14 about his case? 
15 A So then we--we went to see the insurance to 
16 see if they would pay to see a doctor. The insurance 
17 sent me some forms and the thing--they were requesting 
18 a lot of information that had nothing to do with me. 
19 They were asking me about my son's name, my wife's 
20 name, they were not asking information about me. 
21 And they had no right to·request all that 
22 information that had nothing to do with me. I was the 
23 one who was injured. And because I didn't give them 
24 the information about my family that they were 
25 requesting, they closed my case. 
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2 
3 
4 there. 
5 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: (In Spanish.) 
THE INTERPRETER: No. 
THE COURT: No, no, you can't talk from back 
THE WITNESS: And so my wife and I called our 
6 insurances and we were fighting to get this case 
7 opened again. And they gave us a new phone number, we 
8 called, and it's taken us a year to get--to get around 
9 them and so we could see a doctor. 
10 THE COURT: Okay. Anything else on direct 
11 testimony? 
12 THE WITNESS: So it--it's been a year that my 
13 knee has been hurting and it hurts even at the present 
14 time because no one did anything. And so the 
15 insurance, they--because I didn't provide all the 
16 information that the insurance requested, they were 
17 saying that I wanted to commit fraud, but it's not 
18 true . 
19 And they kept saying that I wanted to commit 
20 fraud and that they were going to take me to court so 
21 I could see a judge, or that they were even going to 
22 send me to jail. And why would that be fraud? I--I 
23 got· hurt. 
24 THE COURT: Okay. We're not here to try a 
25 £raud case. Just tell him that. 
17 
.i 
: 
i 
. I 
I 
•... t 
: .1 
;. I 
I 
l 
1 THE WITNESS: Yes, I'm just telling you what 
2 they were telling me. 
3 THE COURT: Are you prepared to be cross-
4 examined at this time? ~ 
5 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
6 THE COURT: Okay. Then Mr. Kesler will ask 
7 you questions that you are required to answer. 
8 
9 
THE WITNESS: Uh-huh. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
10 BY MR. KESLER: 
11 Q Okay. Mr. Mondragon, just--just a quick 
12 question about your TTD claim, your--your time off 
13 work. The Judge mentioned earlier that it was--your 
14 claim was from the date of injury to July 15th, 2012. 
15 On July 15th, 2012, is that the date you returned to 
16 work? 
17 A Yes. Yes, I got a job at another company. 
18 Q And that was with AT Asphalt; is that 
19 correct? ~ 
20 A Yes. 
21 Q Okay. On your--your medical treatment, you 
22 saw a Dr. Andrus on May 7th of this year; correct? 
A Uh-huh, yes. 
Q In that report Dr. Andrus makes mention of 
23 
24 
25 some possible injections. Did you actually receive an 
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1 injection? 
2 A Yes, I did receive one injection, and he 
3 did--he gave it to me. In fact, it didn't help at 
4 all, r--I was left the same. 
5 Q And did you receive that injection at that 
6 same visit? 
7 
8 
9 
10 
A 
Q 
Yes, he did it himself there. 
Okay. 
THE COURT: So that just barely happened? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, it was--it was in the 
11 month that Counsel mentioned. The same day that the 
12 doctor saw me he did the injection. 
13 Q (By Mr. Kesler) Going to the date of injury, 
14 May 22nd of last year, you mentioned in your testimony 
15 that the mechanism of injury, you were emptying the 
16 wheelbarrow when it tipped to its side; is that 
17 correct? 
18 A Yes. It was right before I emptied it, then 
19 it just tipped to one side. And that--that's when it 
20 hit me. 
21 Q Okay. So it was right before--were you in 
22 the process of lifting it up to empty it or were you 
23 actually still pushing the wheelbarrow? 
24 
25 
A 
Q 
No, I was pushing it. I was pushing it. 
And was--was this incident witnessed? 
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1 A No one saw me, but there were other people 
2 working there. And I just told them that I had been 
3 injured. 
4 Q So no one actually saw the accident; is that 
5 correct? 
6 A There was another Mexican, like me, working 
7 there just alongside me, and he did. He did see it 
8 when I got injured. 
9 
10 
Q 
A 
And what is his name? 
I don't know. That was my first day there, 
11 so I didn't know his name. 
12 Q Okay. Going to exactly how the handles 
13 struck your body, you mentioned that the handle, as· it 
14 tipped to the side, caught your right knee. Which 
15 direction did the wheelbarrow tip as you were pushing 
16 it? 
17 A It tipped to--to the right side, I was--right 
18 before I emptied it. And the surface was not very 
19 smoo_th, so it tipped to the side. And you know how it 
20 is, both of your legs and knees are in the middle of 
21 the handles. 
22 Q You mentioned the surface. Were you on 
23 relatively flat ground? Were you on a hill, going up 
24 
25 
or going down? 
A It was on the flat surface, but there were, 
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like, cement bumps, four of them. 
Q The wheelbarrow itself--have you used many 
3 wheelbarrows in--in your life? Are you familiar with 
4 wheelbarrows in general? 
5 A Yes, but it all depends on how--on how heavy 
6 the--the wheelbarrow is and what it contains. And--
7 and also the surface. 
8 Q Okay. And I'm specifically asking about the 
9 size of the wheelbarrow itself. Was it a standard-
sized wheelbarrow? 
A It was a large wheelbarrow. And there are 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
some wheelbarrows that are really, really big, and so 
you can load more material. 
Q So you mentioned it's large. You're 
15 referring to the actual--the basket or the bucket on 
16 the wheelbarrow was deeper than a standard wheel-
17 barrow; is that correct? 
18 A Yeah. Yeah, that was--there are some of them 
19 that are not as deep, but the one that I had that day 
20 was really deep and I was able to load more material 
21 in it. 
22 Q What about the handles of the wheelbarrow? 
23 Can you either estimate or just ~how us with your 
24 hands about how far apart handles on this or, you 
25 know,· a standard wheelbarrow is? 
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1 A Well, you--you should know that. All the 
2 handles for wheelbarrows are about the same distance, 
3 they are not (inaudible). Any wheelbarrow that I have 
4 used, there's the same distance between handles. 
5 Q And that's what I was getting at, is it--it 
6 was a standard-width handle? 
7 A Yes, but if you would like me to, I can stand 
8 up and show you how--how it happened and how my knee 
9 was caught in the--
10 Q Let's--let's proceed with a couple of other 
11 questions and--and I may take you up on that offer. 
12 So describe to me as--or you described in 
your testimony that as it was tipping, the handle 
caught your right knee and that your knee was caught 
between the two handles; is that correct? 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
A Yes. I would like to show you better how it 
went. 
THE COURT: You just answer the question for 
19 now, as best you can. 
20 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
21 MR. KESLER: If you don't mind, Your Honor, 
22 I--I wouldn't mind having him stand--
23 
24 
25 
THE COURT: Okay. I--
MR. KESLER: --and just point--
THE CO0RT: Could you go down in front and 
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1 show us, then? 
2 Q {By Mr. Kesler) Okay. Let--while you're 
3 here, just let me ask you a question. 
4 So as the wheelbarrow is tipping to the 
5 right, can you describe where the handle that would 
6 have been in your right hand would have hit you on 
7 your leg? 
8 
9 
A 
Q 
I--I just want to show you how it happened. 
I'm going to need you to just answer my 
10 questions at this point. 
A Uh-huh. I was holding the wheelbarrow like 11 
12 
13 
this and (inaudible) this. One handle was--one handle 
was on this side and the other handle was on that 
14 side, and this leg was back. 
15 Q Okay, let--let me be a little more clear with 
16 my question. 
17 Can you, with your hand, just point to the 
18 location of the place where the right handle would 
19 have struck your leg as it was falling? 
20 A One handle was here and the other one was 
21 here. 
22 Q Okay. But specifically the right handle, 
23 
24 
25 
which would have been the outside handle, can you show 
me where that would have struck your·leg? 
A The right handle hit me here and the other 
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1 one hit me here. 
2 Q Okay. So are you--are you saying the right 
3 handle would have hit you above your right knee on the 
4 outside of your right leg? 
5 A Yes, yes, here. And the other one hit me 
6 here. 
7 Q Okay. And I missed that. So the other 
8 handle--the left handle, point to where that--that 
9 struck you. 
10 A One hit me here, the other one hit me up 
11 here. 
12 Q Okay. So the left handle, were you pointing 
13 just maybe three or four inches below your right knee 
14 on the inside of your leg? 
15 
16 
17 
A Uh-huh, yes. So when both handles--when my 
knee was between both handles, my bone popped, and I 
think that's when this bone right here did something 
18 weird. 
19 
20 
Q Okay. You can return to the stand now. 
MR. KESLER: Your Honor, we ran--we ran into 
21 this problem at the deposition, just having a--I don't 
22 know if you're having the same problem visualizing 
23 what--
.. 24 
25 
THE COURT: Not at all . 
MR. KESLER: Okay. 
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1 THE COURT: I can see how this could happen. 
2 I've had a wheelbarrow tip on me. 
3 
4 
MR. KESLER: Okay. 
THE COURT: It's not at all difficult to 
5 understand. 
6 MR. KESLER: If--if Your Honor will indulge 
7 me, I actually brought along, just for demonstrative 
8 purposes, a wheelbarrow. Would you allow me to bring 
9 it in and have him demonstrate how this would have 
10 happened? 
THE COURT: Absolutely. 11 
12 MR. KESLER: Okay. Can we just take a brief 
13 two-minute recess and I'll run out and--and grab it 
14 from my vehicle? 
15 THE COURT: Oh, it's out--let's take a five-
16 minute recess. 
17 
18 
19 
THE WITNESS: Uh-huh. 
(A recess was taken.) 
THE COURT: We're back on the record in the 
20 Mondragon matter. And, Counsel, you're cross-
21 examining the witness. 
22 MR. KESLER: Right. Okay. I'm not sure 
23 exactly how you want to do this, Your Honor. If you 
24 just want to have him come down and--
25 THE COURT: You get to ask your--the 
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1 questions and--
2 Q (By Mr. Kesler) Mr. Mondragon, if you could 
3 please come down. I've located a wheelbarrow here in 
4 front of--of counsel's table . 
5 THE COURT: Let me ask first, Mr. Mondragon, 
6 is that a similar-size wheelbarrow? 
7 
8 
9 
THE WITNESS: Yes, it's about the same, yeah. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
Q (By Mr. Kesler) Okay. Mr. Mondragon, if you 
10 could demonstrate. 
11 A So I--when I hit (inaudible) and was walking 
12 and the wheelbarrow was full, and (inaudible) when 
13 this handle right here hit me here·and knocked me 
14 down. 
15 Q Okay. Go ahead and tip that up like you 
16 were. 
17 THE COURT: Don't get hurt, though. 
18 Q (By Mr. Kesler) Now, if you will stop right 
19 there. Back--back up as it's tipping over. Lift it 
20 up. 
21 
22 
A 
Q 
Like this? 
Yeah. And could you note where the right 
23 handle is striking your leg? 
24 A It knocked me down and this handle right here 
25 was the one who hit me right here. 
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1 Q Okay. And then could you--sorry. Could you 
2 tip it back up like you were, again? 
3 
4 
A 
Q 
Like this. 
Okay. And now stop right there. Can you 
5 note--no, I neect-~I need you to stay there. Could you 
6 note where--could you note where the left handle--
7 about what height on your body that handle is located? 
8 
9 
A 
Q 
Right here. 
Would it be correct that that left handle is 
10 about chest height, when--as the wheelbarrow was 
11 tipping over? 
12 A Well, I don't know how--! don't know how it 
13 caught me, but the thing is that it got caught 
14 (inaudible) and the wheelbarrow tipped over to the 
15 side and--and this handle right here was the one that 
16 hit me right here--
Q 
A 
Okay. Could you--
--and that's when I felt my knee kind of 
popping towards the outside--
Q Could you just take--
--inside. 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
A 
Q --that wheelbarrow all the way over onto its 
23 side and just let it rest there? No, without 
24 (inaudible}. Just--just tip it over to the side, 
25 please. Thank you. 
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2 
3 
A 
Q 
Okay. Could you step up to the wheelbarrow? 
What it did--
Oh, no, wait, just--just stand there. Stand 
4 next to the handles, please. Is it correct that that 
5 upper handle, which is the left handle, is about waist 
6 height? 
7 
8 
9 
10 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
No (inaudible}. 
Just below your waist? 
Uh-huh. 
Okay. I think--! think that's all for the 
11 wheelbarrow. You can return to the stand. Thank you. 
12 
13 A 
Mr. Mondragon, how tall are you? 
I think I'm about five--five feet tall, 
14 something like that. 
15 Q Five feet? 
16 A Five, and maybe a little more, but I'm not 
17 sure . 
18 MR. KESLER: I think that's all I've got. 
19 THE COURT: Okay. Do you have anything to 
20 add to your testimony? 
21 MR. MONDRAGON: I (inaudible). I just want 
22 to know if the company is going to pay me. And I 
23 don't know if you noticed in the doctors' reports that 
24 .maybe they want to put me through some type of 
25 something--! don't know what it's called--to see if I 
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1 have any--if my knee is fractured or something is 
2 wrong with it . 
3 THE COURT: Okay. Tell him thank you very 
4 much for his testimony, and you can return back to the 
5 table. 
6 Mr. Kesler, did you have any objection to 
7 P-1? I don't know if you found it already in the 
8 medical--
9 MR. KESLER: It actually is in the medical 
10 records exhibit. I can give you the page, if you'll 
11 give me just a moment. I had it found at one point. 
12 And is that dated the date of injury? 
13 THE COURT: Yes, five twenty--no, wait a 
14 minute. Yes, 5/22/2012. 
15 MR. KESLER: May I approach? Just verify--I 
16 think that's the same; right? 
THE COURT: It is. 
MR. KESLER: Okay. 
17 
18 
19 THE COURT: Thank you. So--it's duplicative, 
20 so, Mr. Mondragon--I'rn going to have to that take 
21 back. 
22 MR. KESLER: Okay. Would you like me to show 
23 him? 
24 
25 
THE COURT: . What page. number is that? 
MR. KESLER: It's MRI 29. 
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1 THE COURT: Mr. Mondragon, that is already 
2 part of the record, so you can keep your paper. And I 
3 have it as part of the official record. 
4 Do you have any other witnesses or evidence? 
5 MR. MONDRAGON: Na, just that--I just want to 
6 know if the doctor's (inaudible)--the doctor's still 
7 going to see me, if the insurance is going to pay for 
8 it, because I need to--to get better. I need to be 
9 healed. 
10 THE COURT: Okay. This is not the time for 
11 argument of the case, if he has no further evidence. 
12 
13 
MR. MONDRAGON: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: Do you have any witnesses or 
14 evidence that you intend to present, Mr. Kesler? 
MR. KESLER: Not from us. 15 
16 THE COURT: Both sides have rested. This is 
17 your chance to make your legal argument as to why your 
18 claim should be allowed. 
19 I will tell you, Mr. Mondragon, a lot of this 
20 case has to do with what the doctors are saying, 
21 because I have doctors saying that your knee was not 
22 hurt at work, but was already hurt from other 
23 injuries, and I have a doctor saying that it was work. 
24 I am not a doctor, so you'll probably be sent to 
25 another doctor--a panel of Labor Commission doctors. 
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MR. MONDRAGON: Can I explain something? 
THE COURT: Oh, he can make a closing 
3 argument, yes . 
4 MR. MONDRAGON: I explained that to the 
5 doctor, that the accidents that I had--that I had 
6 before, they sent me to see doctors for those 
7 accidents and to do therapy, and my knee was fine 
8 after that. 
9 THE COURT: Yes, that 1 s in the medical 
10 record. But still, some doctors are not convinced 
11 that--that this is the same thing. 
12 MR. MONDRAGON: This is a different thing. 
13 This· is what happened to me when I got injured at--at 
14 that job, and the other ones don't have anything to do 
15 with it. Where I worked before, they had really, 
16 really good insurance, and so they--they make sure 
17 that my knee was fine. And I just noticed that this 
18 insurance, in particular, is trying to look for any 
19 excuses to not approve the case. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. We'll let me Mr. Kesler 
21 make his closing argument. 
22 MR. KESLER: Thank you, Your Honor. 
23 As I mentioned in opening, there have been 
24 - numerous problems with this claim from the beginning . 
25 It was initially denied due to Petitioner's refusal to 
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cooperate. There have been, as Your Honor is aware, 
delays, motions to compel, continuances due to 
discovery issues. 
More than that, the description of the 
accident that Petitioner alleges--he testified that 
the handle struck him--the right handle, as the 
wheelbarrow was tipping to the right, struck him three 
to four inches above his right knee, on the outside of 
his leg. He testified that the left handle--testified 
that the left handle struck him three to four inches 
below the knee, on the inside of his right leg, as the 
wheelbarrow was tipping to the right. 
On our demonstrative exhibit here, Petitioner 
showed that as the wheelbarrow was tipping, while the 
right handle could strike the outside of his right leg 
at some point, the left handle was at chest height. 
Your Honor, Petitioner states he's around five feet 
tall. I'm six foot. I spent 20 minutes last night 
with this wheelbarrow, trying to recreate the injury 
that Petitioner describes and--and I could not do it. 
The--the handles--the way that he--he 
explains they trapped his leg, they were not--they 
will not fit between my legs. And, as you noticed, as 
Peti t.ioner was standing., the upper handle, as--
wherever it was tipped was at--at or just below his 
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1 waist level. There's no physical way that that handle 
2 could have simultaneously been on the inside of his 
3 leg and the outside of his leg at a distance of little 
4 more than a foot apart when, as you can see, 
5 wheelbarrow handles are at least double that distance 
6 in width. And those handles don't change as--as the 
7 wheelbarrow falls. 
8 It's--based on Petitioner's testimony and 
9 what we've seen here today, it just makes no logical 
10 sense that this--
THE COURT: You can't help. 
MR. KESLER: --that this incident--
LUIS MONDRAGON: Can't I talk--
THE COURT: No. 
LUIS MONDRAGON: --or {inaudible)? 
THE COURT: You can't talk. 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 LUIS MONDRAGON: I'm a witness, so I want to 
18 say something . 
19 THE COURT: No, you're not a witness. You 
20 haven't been called in this hearing. Thank you. 
21 MR. KESLER: It makes no sense that the 
22 incident could have occurred, at least the way that he 
23 described it. Petitioner alleges that there was a 
24 witness. He was questioned about this earlier in 
25 discovery, in deposition. He· can't produce this 
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2 It's clear--Dr. Fotheringham, in his report, 
3 notes, "It's clear that the patient has quite an 
4 extensive history of prior knee pain." Respondents 
5 contend that this incident that was unwitnessed, or 
6 that Petitioner cannot produce corroborating 
7 testimony, did not occur. 
8 Petitioner--it's clear that he had 
9 preexisting knee problems. This was his first day on 
10 the job and it's--the facts just stack up in such a 
11 way that Respondents cannot reach a point where we can 
12 see how this incident occurred. 
13 
14 
Additionally, the initial medical report we 
reference in here at MR29, it shows--or I apologize, 
15 not MR at 29, it's MR30--it shows there was no 
16 bruising on Petitioner's leg. There was--Petitioner 
17 mentioned that his leg had--had swollen in multiple 
18 locations on his leg. 
19 He mentioned that--on the inside of his right 
20 knee, on the front and the back were swollen. The 
21 report mentions there may have been--I apologize--
22 there may have been slight swelling above the joint 
23 line medally--medially, but there was no additional 
24 .swelling, no bruising, none of the telltale signs 
25 that--that an incident of this nature, a wheelbarrow 
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1 full of gravel tipping over and striking your leg had 
2 actually occurred. 
3 Your Honor, it--Respondents submit that 
4 Petitioner has not and cannot satisfy his burden of 
5 showing that this accident occurred and submit that, 
6 therefore, his case should be dismissed. However, in 
7 the event that Your Honor finds that the accident did 
8 occur, based on Dr. Fotheringham's report, this is 
9 going to have to go to a medical panel to address 
10 causation, treatment, as well as causation of his--his 
11 current symptoms. 
12 We--we settled the wage issue earlier, so 
13 that--that has been resolved. So in the--in the event 
14 that, notwithstanding the implausible nature of the 
15 accident, Your Honor finds that this occurred, then--
16 then this case will clearly have to go to a medical 
17 panel. And with that, we submit it. 
18 THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Mondragon, as I 
19 indicated, you get the last word because you--it's 
20 your case, so you can--
MR. MONDRAGON: The person that saw it, I 
22 don't know his name, but I know where he lives, so I 
23 can take him there (inaudible)--
2.4 THE COURT: No, .. today's the date and time for 
25· trial, so ... So, but he can--
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1 MR. MONDRAGON: The handle--the right handle, 
2 when the wheelbarrow tipped over, is the one that hit 
3 me really hard right here above the knee. 
4 THE COURT: All right. I wish I could tell 
5 you that these cases could be resolved quickly, but 
6 especially where there are doctors saying two 
7 different things, they take some time. You will get a 
8 decision in writing that will tell you what the 
9 decision is, and it may require that you cooperate and 
10 go to a Labor Commission medical panel. 
11 With that being said, the evidentiary record 
12 will be closed and we're adjourned. 
13 MR. MONDRAGON: So when you said "in 
14 writing"--so (inaudible)--
15 THE COURT: We're back on the record, 
16 apparently. We're sort of adjourned. 
17 MR. MONDRAGON: So the decision would be sent 
18 in writing; is that what you are saying? 
19 THE COURT: Yes. 
20 MR. MONDRAGON: So what about the medical 
21 bills that I'm getting? Can they pay for that? 
22 THE COURT: At this point they're being 
23 denied and that would be (inaudible). Is that 
24 correct, Mr. Kesler? 
25 MR. KESLER: Correct. 
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1 MR. MONDRAGON: But why are they denied? 
2 They--they committed to pay them. 
3 THE COURT: The whole reason that we're here 
4 is because they, number one, don't believe the 
5 accident happened. And number two, they have a doctor 
6 that says his knee was already injured and it isn't 
7 due to the accident. 
8 
9 
MR. MONDRAGON: Which--which doctor is that? 
THE COURT: Dr. Fotheringham. And that's why 
10 I have to send it to my own doctors . 
11 
12 
All right. The case is over at this point. 
MR. MONDRAGON: It's not that I wanted to go 
13 to the doctor on my own. They sent me to see--
14 THE COURT: Right. Absolutely, that's their 
15 right. They get to do that. 
16 MR. KESLER: I'm sorry, Your Honor. Are we 
1 7 adjourned? 
18 THE COURT: Well, we have been adjourned. 
19 And, you know, this is not the time--the--the case is 
20 over, there--we're here because you disagree. You 
21 have your side, they have theirs. I will issue a 
22 decision in writing, and the case is closed. 
23 
24 
25 
(The hearing was concluded.) 
* * * 
* * * 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
ss. 
I, Ann M. Love, a Registered Professional 
Reporter and Notary Public within and for the State of 
Utah, do hereby certify: 
That the foregoing tape-recorded proceedings were 
transcribed into typewriting under my direction and 
supervision and that the foregoing pages contain a 
true and correct transcription of said proceedings to 
the best of my ability to do so. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto subscribed my 
name and seal this 21st day of September 2014 . 
ANN M. LOVE, RPR 
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
ADJUDICATION DMSION 
Southern Utah Adjudication Office 
1173 South 250 West 
Bldg. 1 Ste. 304 
Saint George UT 84770 
(435) 634-5580 
ALBERTO MONDRAGON, 
Petitioner, FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER 
vs. Case No. 12-0664 
]P'S LANDSCAPING and/ or OWNERS 
INSURANCE CO, Judge Cheryl D Luke 
Respondent. 
HEARING: 
BEFORE: 
2nd Floor Courtroom, Labor Commission, 68 S 100.E, PO Box 1840, 
Parowan UT 84761, on June 12, 2013 at 9:00AM. Said Hearing was 
pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission. 
Chetyl D Luke, Administrative Law Judge. 
APPEARANCES: The Petitioner, Alberto Mondragon, was present and represented himself. 
The Respondents, JP's Landscaping and Owners Insurance Co, were 
represented by attorney Cody Kessler. 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Petitioner, Alberto Mondragon, filed an Application for Hearing with the Adjudication Division 
of the Utah Labor Commission C'Court") on August 17, 2012, and claimed entitlement to the 
following workers' compensation benefits: (1) medical expenses; (2) recommended medical care, 
and; (3) temporaty total disability compensation. Mr. Mondragon's claim for workers' compensation 
benefits arose out of an industrial accident that occurred on 5/22/2012. 
The Respondents denied that there was an industrial accident on 5/22/2012 or that the accident 
medically caused Alberto Mondtagon's injuries. The Respondents argued that Alberto Mondragon 
suffered preexisting or independent medical problems that caused any disability endured by Alberto 
Mondragon. 
Respondents argued that Mr. Mondragon's medical history demonstrated that his current knee 
problems are part of his histoty of degenerative and arthritic knee conditions and not medically 
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causally .related to the industrial accident. They did not argue legal causation .in the matter and no 
medical opinion exists regarding contribution and therefore legal causation is not at issue. 
The Court held an evidentiary hearing on June 12, 2013, and issued an Interim Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order on November 5, 2013. On November 14, 2013, the Court refetted 
the medical issues to a medical panel, which filed its report on May 8, 2014. The Court then mailed 
the Medical Panel Report to the parties on May 14, 2014, and g-ranted the parties 20 days to file any 
objections to the admissibility of the report. On May 21, 2014, Respondents filed an objection to the 
Report, arguing that the matter should have been dismissed after the hearing axguing that the 
Petitioner did not meet his burden of proof that an accident occurred. Respondent also argued the 
medical panel report should not be admitted into the record because the panel relied on facts that 
are not consistent with the Interim Order and Findings of Fact. 
Respondent's argument that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of p.toof that an accident 
occurred fails to understand the Court's previous ruling based on the evidence presented at the 
hearing. The Court found Mr. Mondragon's testimony regarding his work day to be believable and 
truthful. Mr. Mondragon had without a doubt been working for Respondent employer hauling a 
wheel barrow full of g-ravel at the time of the injury. He was working fast, almost running, with a 
large conttactot wheel barrow when he lost control of the load and it tipped. At that point Mr. 
Mondragon's accident description is flawed in the details. Mr. Mondragon has always felt he was hit 
in the knee while being caught between the wheel barrow handles. Respondents brought a wheel 
banow to court and asked M.r. Mondragon to demonstrate the physical aspects of the accident. 
Given M.t. Mondragon's height and the size of a similar wheel battow it did not seem likely that the 
handle hit Mr. Mondragon's knee as previously stated. What remained quite dear was that Mr. 
Mondragon did use his legs and body to tty and keep control of the wheel barrow and when the 
heavy load tipped he and the wheel barrow where jerked and tousled. It is common experience to 
know how quickly a heavy wheel barrow can become out of control as it is the nature of the one 
wheeled device. 
It is one thing for Respondent's to show that the exact mechanism of injury as previously stated was 
not correct but their argument failed when they went so far as to argue that no accident at all took 
place. This Court finds it easy to believe that people can be hurt and that they may be confused 
about the "mechanism of injury" which is important only in this legal setting and not a concern of 
most accident victims. If Mr. Mondragon has a flawed recollection of the details of the injury or 
even if a victim had little or no recollection of accident details the case can be made that an accident 
took place from the facts known before and aftet the moment of injury. In this case we know the 
nature of the_ heavy work being done, the pace of the work, the loss of control over the wheel 
barrow and the resultant pain and injury. The evidence proved that an industrial accident of 
substantial exertion took place. 
The Court sent the matter to the medical panel with an accurate factual description of the known 
events and also told them the exact mechanism of injury was not known. The panel did not engage 
in fact finding or act in a manner that was repugnant to the Coutts Findings of Fact. Here 
Respondent again inflates his argument and evidence. On page five of Respondent's objection they 
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note that the Court failed to inform the medical panel that a "twisting type injuty" was disproved at 
trial and goes on to say that the Court only told the panel that the evidence showed that the handle 
of the wheel barrow did not «rut'• Mr. Mondragon's right knee. That is because the demonstration 
as seen and evaluated by the Court showed that the handle of the wheel barrow did not "hit'' Mr. 
Moncb:agon's knee in the demonstration that detail was disproved The demonstration did convince 
the Court that Mr. Mondragon had the accident with the tipping wheel barrow and he did injure his 
knee at that time. 
The medical panel uses the word twisting type injw:y and then they go on to explain and support 
their opinion by noting that «the prolonged nature of the medial joint line pain and swelling the 
findings on physical examination of medial pain, +McMurray's, and a Baker,s cyst all suggest injw:y 
of the meniscus." The panel used their medical expertise and the medical evidence before them to 
form a medical causal opinion regarding the work accident and a meniscal injury. 
The Court has the responsibility of detenn.ining the factual evidence in this case. The medical panel 
had the responsibility to perform their examination which includes taicing a medical history. In this 
case the information they were given regarding "twisting" is completely consistent with the in court 
demonstration done with the wheel barrow and is not repugnant in any way to the evidence 
presented in this matter. 
Under Utah Code Section 34A-2-601 allow parties an opportunity to object to medical panel 
reports. If no objection is filed the report is entered into the record and at that point, the 
preponderance of all evidence, including medical evidence, must be considered in reaching a final 
determination in the matter. 
In this case the objection filed goes to the weight the report should be given rather than its 
admission into the record. The Court finds no new or compelling evidence that is a basis for 
holding a hearing oµ the report or for excluding the report from the record The medical panel 
report is admitted into the record pursuant to Utah Code Section 34A-2-601. 
II. FINDINGS OF FACT 
A. Employment. 
The Respondent JP's Landscaping, insured by Owners Insurance Co, employed Alberto Mondragon 
on 5/22/2012. 
B. Compensation Rate. (Not in dispute) 
At the ti.me of the accident in issue, Alberto Mondragon eamed $12. per hour and worked a 40 hour 
workweek. 
C. Light Duty Work 
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There was no light duty work available. lvfr. Mondragon was terminated from employment with 
Respondent after the accident. Mr. Mondragon went back to work on July 15, 2012 with ADT 
asphalt and works in a heavy exertion job. 
D. Industrial Accident and Injwy. 
The exact mechanism of injury is unclear. Mr. Mondragon was working with a wheel barrow full of 
gravel at the time of the injury. He was working fast, ahnost running, with a large contractor wheel 
barrow when he lost control of the load and it tipped. Mr. Mondragon believed that one of the 
handles of the wheel barrow hit his right knee. An in court demonstration proved that the accident 
could not have occurred as described. It is clear that Mr. Mondragon felt a pop in the knee. 
He was seen at Work-med on the day of the accident about three hours post accident. At that time 
the doctor noted that the right knee appeared normal in appearance. There was no visible bruising. 
There may have been slight swelling above the joint line medially. There was no patellar swelling or 
tenderness. He was diagnosed with a right knee sprain. He was given medication and released to 
light duty and was to be referred to ao orthopedic specialist for further evaluation. [IvfRE page 31 
and 32] 
E. Medical Opinions 
The Plaintiff had two prior work related knee injuries, both of which diagnosed contusions and were 
reportedly resolved. Dr. Andrus at Zion's orthopedic clinic noted that 2006 radiograpbs showed 
some mild degenerative joint disease. 
Dr. Bart Fotheringham performed an independent medical examination in this matter. He opines 
that the Petitioner had an extensive history of prior knee pain. He opines the accident at issue may 
have aggravated preexisting degenerative changes. He states he does not believe it is within 
reasonable medical probability his current symptoms are the direct .result of the accident at issue. 
He finds the return of the Petitioner to heavy work by July 15, 2012 shows that the injury from this 
accident ended. He then feels other factors or injury after that date would be responsible for current 
complaints. 
Treating physicians are recommending treatment and indicate the accident is industrial. 
Recommendation for future treatment involves further diagnostic scans and then treatment as 
indicated Dr. Fotheringham does not think that further treatment is necessary as a result of the 
accident at issue. 
Dr. Scott Smith, an orthopaedic surgeon, served as medical panel chair in this matter. Dr. Ross 
McNaught, an orthopedic specialist, served as a panel member. The medical panel had the Interim 
Order and Findings of Fact entered after the hearing in the matter; the medical records; diagnostics; 
and, they had the opportunity to examine the Petitioner. 
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The panel opined that there is a causal connection between the accident in 2012 and the petitioner's 
ongoing knee problems. They noted that although the Petitioner has suffered previous medical 
conditions to the knee they were contusions and not similar to the present injury. They explain, "He 
was doing heavy labor prior to the industrial mishap without symptoms. His accident occurred. His 
symptoms began at the time of his injury and have been unabated since." 
The Panel specifically disagrees with Dr. Fotheringham. They note that Dr. Fotheringham opines 
that the 2012 accident aggravated pre-existing degenerative changes. The panel notes that it is 
unlikely that arthritis (degenerative change) is the cause of Mr. Mondragon's problems because 
radiographs show healthy joint weight bearing surfaces, with minimal arthritic changes consistent 
with age and heavy use. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Section 34A-2-418 (1) of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act requires employers and insurance 
companies to pay "reasonable swns for [medical care] necessary to tteat" a work injury. 
We do know that Mr. Mondragon was well with no knee impairment and capable of heavy work 
prior to the accident. We know what he was doing at the time of the accident and that was wheeling 
a very heavy large wheelbarrow at a fast pace when he unexpectedly lost control of the load. At that 
time he felt a "pop" in his knee and from that point suffered the pain and injury consistent with a 
finding of meniscal tear. 
Mr. Mondragon does not accurately describe the exact details of the accident Preswnably he was 
trying to recover the load and focused on his work. Demanding more precision about the exact 
mechanism of injury is inconsistent with the spirit of the workers' compensation law which is to be 
liberally construed to accomplish its purpose of assisting injured workers and avoiding the costs 
associated with traditional civil liability and litigation. 
The panel analyzed the medical history in this case and it is clear from the date of injury to the 
present Mr. Mondragon's knee problem is consistent with a meniscal injury suffexed at the time of 
accident. 
The panel opines that Mr. Mondragon's necessary medical care to treat injury from the industrial 
accident has been his past care and in the future a right knee arthroscopy, physical therapy post-
surgery, and post operative medications. The panel does not find that cortisone injections a.re 
necessary at this time. 
[Intentionally left blank] 
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ORDER 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED JP's Landscaping and/ or Owners Insurance Co shall pay past 
and future medical bills related to the necessary care ofIYfr. Mondragon's right knee injury consistent 
with the medical panel's opinion including an arthroscopic meniscectomy and post surgical care. 
DATEDthis_0-=--_day·of ~t • 2014. 
Administrative Law Judge 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the Adjudication Division of 
the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific basis for review 
and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this decision is signed. 
Other parties may then submit their responses to the Motion for Review within 20 days of the date 
of the Motion for Review. 
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct the 
foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its response. 
If none of the parties specifically request review by the Appeals Boll.rd, the review wilbbe conducted 
by the Utah Labor Commissioner. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Order, was mailed on September 3, 2014, to the persons/parties at the following addtesses: 
Alberto Mondngon 
465 S 100 E 
Ivins UT 84 738 
Owners Insurance Co 
olson.jake@aoins.com 
JP's Landscaping 
c/ o mark-sumsion@rbmn.com 
Mark R Sumsion Esq 
mark-swnsion@rbmn.com 
Clerk 
Adjudication Division 
00123 
AddendumC 
@ 
@ 
@ 
·) 
.-
ALBERTO MONDRAGON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
APPEALS BOARD 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
ORDER AFFIRMING 
ALJ'S DECISION 
JP'S LANDSCAPING and OWNERS 
INSURANCE CO., Case No. 12-0664 
Respondents. 
JP's Landscaping and its insurance carrier, Owners Insurance Co., (collectively referred to as 
"JP") ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to review Administrative Law Judge 
Luke's award of benefits to Alberto Mondragon under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, Title 
34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated. 
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to §630-4-3 0 I 
of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act and §34A-2-801(4) of the Utah Workers' Compensation 
Act. 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES PRESENTED 
Mr. Mondragon claims workers' compensation benefits for a right-knee injury he attributes to 
an accident on May 22, 2012, while he was working for JP. In his application for hearing, Mr. 
Mondragon asserts that he was pushing a full wheelbarrow when it tipped over and "caught" his right 
knee. He later described that his right knee was caught and twisted between the handles of the 
wheelbarrow as it tipped over. 
Judge Luke held an evidentiary hearing, during which Mr. Mondragon was asked to 
demonstrate how the injury occurred with a wheelbarrow similar to the one he was using at the time 
of the accident. The demonstration showed that the wheelbarrow handles could not have caught and 
twisted Mr. Mondragon's right knee as he alleged because they were too far apart. Judge Luke 
nevertheless concluded it was "clear Mr. Mondragon felt a pop" in his right knee as a result of the 
accident while working for JP. 
Judge Luke determined that the medical aspects of the claim should be referred to an 
impartial medical panel. The medical panel described Mr. Mondragon's injury as a twisting injury. 
The panel concluded that Mr. Mondragon's right-knee problems were medically caused by the work 
accident and recommended arthroscopic evaluation. Judge Luke relied on the medical panel's 
opinion over JP's objection and awarded Mr. Mondragon the cost of medical treatment and future 
medical care outlined by the panel. 
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JP requested review of Judge Luke's decision by arguing that the award of benefits was error 
because the work accident could not have occurred as described by Mr. Mondragon. The 
Commission determined that although Mr. Mondragon was probably mistaken about the exact 
mechanism of injury, there was sufficient evidence to show that he sustained a right-knee injury 
while working for JP. The Commission remanded the matter to Judge Luke for clarification of the 
medical panel's findings in light of the fact that the mechanism of injury was uncertain. 
On remand, the medical panel clarified its reasoning and ultimately reiterated its opinion that 
Mr. Mondragon's right-knee injury was medically caused by his employment with JP. Judge Luke 
relied on the medical panel's clarified report and awarded Mr. Mondragon benefits, including the 
treatment recommended by the medical panel. JP now seeks review of Judge Luke's order on 
remand by the Appeals Board. JP renews its argument that Mr. Mondragon's claim should have 
been dismissed without referral to the medical panel because he did not show that the accident 
actually occurred. JP also reiterates that Judge Luke impermissibly raised a theory of the accident 
that Mr. Mondragon did not allege. Lastly, JP contends that even if another theory of the accident is 
allowed, the matter must be remanded so that JP can properly argue its defense that Mr. Mondragon 
has not met the more stringent standard of legal causation outlined in Allen v. Industrial Comm 'n, 
729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Appeals Board adopts and summarizes the Commission's previous findings of fact in 
this matter and finds additional facts from the record to be material to JP' s motion for review. Mr. 
Mondragon has a history of bilateral knee pain. On May 22, 2012, Mr. Mondragon began working 
for JP as part of its landscaping business. On that day, Mr. Mondragon asserts that he was working 
very quickly carrying a full wheelbarrow when it fell over and injured his right knee. During the 
evidentiary hearing, Mr. Mondragon described that he felt his right knee pop. He explained that his 
right knee became caught between the wheelbarrow handles when the left handle struck the inside of 
his right leg a few inches below the knee and the right handle struck him above the knee. At the 
hearing, Mr. Mondragon was unable to replicate the mechanism of injury because the wheelbarrow 
handles were too far apart to twist his knee between them. 
Mr. Mondragon testified that he experienced severe swelling in his right knee due to the 
accident. He describes that he reported the accident and was sent to WorkMed for evaluation. Dr. 
Britt at WorkMed recounts Mr. Mondragon's description of the accident as slipping when a full 
wheelbarrow tilted and feeling a sudden Hpop" and pain in his right knee but no impact to the knee. 
Dr. Britt examined Mr. Mondragon and noted that there ''may be slight swelling" in his right knee, 
but that it appeared normal with no visible bruising. Dr. Britt assessed Mr. Mondragon with a right-
knee sprain and released him to light-duty work. JP did not have light-duty work available and 
terminated Mr. Mondragon's employment. He returned to work on July 15, 2012, with another 
employer. 
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On May 7, 2013, nearly a year after the accident, Mr. Mondragon sought treatment from Dr. 
Andruss for pain in his right knee. Mr. Mondragon told Dr. Andruss that the injury occurred when a 
full wheelbarrow fell on its side and "trapped" his right knee, which Dr. Andruss described as a 
"rotation-type" injury. Dr. Andruss noted that radiographs showed moderate arthritic changes to 
both of Mr. Mondragon's knees, with some mild patellofemoral arthritis in his right knee. Dr. 
Andruss concluded that Mr. Mondragon's current condition was likely medically caused by the 2012 
work accident. Dr. Andruss based his diagnosis on Mr. Mondragon's description of the mechanism 
of injury and his subjective complaints, as well as the examination findings. 
A few weeks later, JP's medical consultant, Dr. Fotheringham, evaluated Mr. Mondragon's 
right-knee condition. Dr. Fotheringham opined that Mr. Mondragon's current right-knee problems 
were not medically caused by the work accident. Dr. Fotheringham opined that the work accident 
may have aggravated the underlying degenerative changes in Mr. Mondragon 's right knee, but only 
temporarily. Dr. Fotheringham referred to treatment notes by Adon Pearson, PA-C, on August 31, 
2012, in which Mr. Mondragon was noted to have experienced knee pain for a month. Dr. 
Fotheringham reasoned that the treatment notes from Mr. Pearson suggest Mr. Mondragon re-injured 
his right knee after he returned to work for a different employer in July 2012. However, such 
treatment notes could not be located in the medical record. Dr. Fotheringham concluded it was not 
medically probable that Mr. Mondragon required future medical care as a result of the accident, but 
found that the treatment from WorkMed was appropriate. 
· Judge Luke referred the medical aspects of this matter to an impartial medical panel 
consisting of Dr. Smith, an orthopedic surgeon, and Dr. McNaught, an orthopedic expert. The 
medical panel reviewed Mr. Mondragon' s relevant medical history and examined him. As described 
above, the panel was instructed to clarify its opinion based on an uncertain mechanism of injury 
rather than the one that the panel surmised in its first report. In its clarified report, the medical panel 
acknowledged that the exact mechanism of injury was unclear, but that the evidence showed Mr. 
Mondragon was carrying a full wheelbarrow very quickly when he lost control of it and the 
wheelbarrow tipped over. The panel explained that the amount and type of stress on Mr. 
Mondragon's knee while trying to hold a full wheelbarrow and keep it from tipping over is 
significant and could cause a meniscal tear. The panel added that individuals who suffer a tom 
meniscus often describe the sensation of being hit in the knee like Mr. Mondragon did. 
The medical panel noted that the right-knee symptoms Mr. Mondragon reported, such as 
prolonged medial joint line pain, swelling, a positive McMurray's test, and a Baker's cyst all 
suggested an acute injury to the meniscus and he had not experienced such symptoms with his 
previous knee problems. The panel explained that Mr. Mondragon's right-knee inju1y was different 
from his previous knee problems because they did not involve the joint. The panel ultimately 
confirmed its original finding that Mr. Mondragon's right-knee symptoms were likely due to a 
meniscal injury that occurred during the work accident. The panel recommended an arthroscopic 
evaluation, along with doctor's visits and medication, as treatment for Mr. Mondragon's work injury. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Utah Workers' Compensation Act provides benefits to workers injured by accident 
"arising out of and in the course of' employment. Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-40 l. To qualify for 
benefits under the foregoing standard, an injured worker must establish that his or her work was both 
the legal cause and the medical cause of the injury in question. See Allen, supra. Implicit in this 
standard is the injured worker's burden to show that an accident actually occurred. In its motion for 
review, JP contends that Mr. Mondragon' s claim should have been dismissed after it was shown that 
the wheelbarrow handles could not have twisted his right knee as he described. However, the 
Commission already considered and rejected this argument in remanding the matter to Judge Luke 
for clarification of the medical panel's report. 
The Appeals Board agrees with the Commission and Judge Luke that there was sufficient 
evidence of a work injury and conflicting opinions with regard to its medical cause to refer the issue 
to a medical panel. The evidence in the record supports Mr. Mondragon's claim that he sustained a 
right-knee injury during the work accident even if it did not happen exactly as he described it to have 
occurred. Indeed, the medical panel explained that individuals who suffer meniscal injuries often 
feel they were hit in the knee as Mr. Mondragon did. The Appeals Board finds that it would be 
unreasonable to foreclo.se Mr. Mondragon's claim under these circumstances. 
JP's second argument is that it was prejudiced when Judge Luke impennissibly raised a 
theory of the accident that Mr. Mondragon did not allege. Again, this ~rgument was previously 
considered and rejected by the Commission. While the exact mechanism of injury is somewhat 
uncertain in this case, such uncertainty is not fatal to Mr. Mondragon's claim. As both Judge Luke 
and the Commission recognized, it is not uncommon for an injured worker to be unclear about a 
specific exertion that leads to an internal injury. Mr. Mondragon was incorrect regarding how his 
right knee became injured, but the record does show that his right knee was subject to significant 
stress while carrying a fully loaded wheelbarrow that tipped over. 
The Appeals Board does not agree with JP that Judge Luke advocated on behalf of Mr. 
Mondragon by advancing an alternate theory of the accident because the significant stress on his 
right knee was well-established in the record. JP had notice of the circumstances of the accident as 
they were outlined by Dr. Britt at WorkMed almost immediately after the accident. Dr. Britt 
recounted that Mr. Mondragon slipped when a full wheelbarrow tilted and caused him to feel a 
sudden '~pop" and pain in his light knee. These are the circumstances that were the basis for the prior 
decisions from Judge Luke and the Commission. The Appeals Board does not agree with JP that 
either Judge Luke or the Commission impermissibly raised an alternate theory of the accident 
because the underlying circumstances of the accident were contained in the record. 
JP's last argument in its motion for review is that the matter should be remanded for 
consideration of its legal-causation defense. JP submits that the more stringent standard of legal 
causation outlined in Allen v. Industrial Comm 'n applies to Mr. Mondragon's claim because he had a 
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pre-existing right-knee condition that contributed to his injury. JP refers to Dr. Fotheringham's 
opinion that the work accident may have aggravated an underlying condition in Mr. Mondragon's 
right knee as support for its position that the more stringent standard oflegal causation should apply 
to the claim. The Appeals Board is not persuaded by this argument, however, because the medical 
panel's report shows that Mr. Mondragon' s prior right-knee problems did not involve the joint. The 
panel also explained that Mr. Mondragon's prior right-knee problems did not involve the same type 
of symptoms he has with his current right-knee injury. The Appeals Board finds the medical panel's 
clarified report to be well-reasoned and persuasive in light of the panel's impartial and collegial 
review of the relevant medical evidence. 
Even if the Appeals Board were to accept that the more stringent standard oflegal causation 
applied to Mr. Mondragon's claim, the work activity of carrying a wheelbarrow full oflandscaping 
material at a rapid pace over uneven ground as the wheelbarrow tips over likely constitutes an 
unusual or extraordinary exertion when compared to those of modem non-employment life. The 
Appeals Board does not agree with JP's contention that the totality of Mr. Mondragon's work 
activity represents a normal or ordinary exertion just because it is relatively common for a 
wheelbarrow to tip over. 
Although Mr. Mondragon's mistaken description of exactly how his work injury occurred 
presented a challenge in adjudicating his claim, his mistake was not fatal to his claim because the 
underlying and dispositive circumstances of the accident were established in the record even though 
the precise mechanism of injury was not. The Appeals Board agrees with Judge Luke and the 
Commission that an injured worker, especially one who is unrepresented like Mr. Mondragon, may 
make a mistake regarding an aspect of his or her claim and that the underlying evidence may be 
considered and addressed by the factfinder without crossing into advocacy or infringing on the due 
process rights of the employer or insurance carrier. That is essentially what took place in this case. 
Based on the foregoing, the Appeals Board concurs with Judge Luke's decision awarding benefits to 
Mr. Mondragon. 
[ THIS SPACE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK] 
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ORDER 
The Appeals Board affirms Judge Luke's decision dated April 29, 2015. It is so ordered. 
Dated this JS-ri:-day of August, 2015. 
~✓47~ 
Colleen S. Colton, Chair 
~v,,sxf~ 
Patricia S. Drawe 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider this 
Order. Any such request for reconsideration must be received by the Appeals Board within 20 days 
of the date of this order. Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals 
by filing a petition for review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the 
court within 30 days of the date of this order. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Affirming ALJ's Decision in the ~tterof Alberto 
Mondragon, case number 12-0664, was mailed first class postage prepaid this dlff!_-day of August, 
2015, to the following: 
Alberto Mondragon 
465 S lOOE 
Ivins UT 84738 
JP's Landscaping 
2775 E Washington Dam Rd 
Washington UT 84780 
Owners Insurance Co. 
Jake Olson Designated Agent 
Box 690 
Riverton UT 84065 
Mark R. Sumsion, Esq. 
Richards Brandt Miller & Nelson 
Box 2465 
Salt Lake City UT 8411 0 
kYLL 
Sara Danielson 
Utah Labor Commission 
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AddendumD 
ALBERTO MONDRAGON, 
Petitioner, 
APPEALS BOARD 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
vs. 
ORDER DENYING REQUEST 
FOR RECONSJDERA TION 
JP1S LANDSCAPING and o·WNERS 
INSURANCE CO, 
Respondents. 
Case No. 12-0664 
JP's Landscaping and its insurance carrier, Owners Insurance Co/collectively referred to as 
"JP") ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider its prior decision to affinn 
Judge Luke's award of benefits to Alberto Mondragon under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, 
Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated. 
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to §63 G-4-302 of the 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act. 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES PRESENTED 
Mr. Mondragon claims workers' compensation benefits for a right-knee injury he attribute·s to 
an accident on May 22, 2012, while he was working for JP. In his application for hearing, Mr. 
Mondragon asserts that he was pushing a full wheelbarrow when it tipped over and "caught" his right 
knee. He later described that his right knee was caught and twisted between the handles of the 
wheelbarrow as it tipped over. 
Judge Luke held an evidentiary hearing, during which Mr. Mondragon was asked to 
demonstrate how the injury occurred with a wheelbarrow similar to the one he was using at the time 
of the accident. The demonstration showed that the wheelbarrow handles could not have caught and 
twisted Mr. Mondragon's right knee as he alleged because they were too far apart. Judge Luke 
nevertheless concluded it was "clear Mr. Mondragon felt a pop" in his right knee while working for 
JP. Judge Luke referred the medical aspects of the claim to an impartial medical panel, which 
described Mr. Mondragon's injury as a twisting injury. The panel concluded that Mr. Mond_ragon's 
right-knee problems were medically caused by the work accident and recommended arthroscopic 
evaluation. Judge Luke relied on the medical panel's opinion over JP's objection and awarded Mr. 
Mondragon the cost of medical treatment and future medical care outlined by the panel. 
JP requested review of Judge Luke's decision by arguing that the award of benefits was en-or 
because the work accident could not have occurred as described by Mr. Mondragon. The 
Commission determined that although Mr. Mondragon was probably mistaken about the exact 
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mechanism of injury, there was sufficient evidence to show that he sustained a right-knee injury 
while working for JP. The Commission remanded the matter to Judge Luke for clarification of the 
medical panel's findings in light of the fact that the mechanism ofinjury was uncertain. On remand, 
the medical panel clarified its reasoning and ultimately reiterated its opinion that Mr. Mondragon's 
right-knee injury was medically caused by his employment with JP. Judge Luke relied on the 
medical panel's clarified report and awarded Mr. Mondragon benefits, including the treatment 
recommended by the medical panel. 
JP sought review of Judge Luke's latest award from the Appeals Board, which rejected JP's 
arguments and affirmed Judge Luke's award based on the medical evidence provided. JP now seeks 
reconsideration of the Appeals Board's decision by arguing that Judge Luke and the Appeals Board 
have impennissibly advocated for Mr. Mondragon while he has failed to respond to JP's various 
motions. JP also submits that the award of benefits should be set aside so it can investigate potential 
fraud as a defense against Mr. Mondragon's claim. 
DISCUSSION 
JP's contention that Judge Luke, the Commission, or the Appeals Board has engaged in 
advocating for Mr. Mondragon has already been considered and rejected. Although Mr. Mondragon, 
as an unrepresented party, has not submitted responses to all of JP's various motions in this matter, 
the Appeals Board does not agree that the Commission has advocated on Mr. Mondragon's behalf. 
Judge Luke, the Commission, and the Appeals Board each reviewed the evidence in the record, 
including the medical evidence of Mr. Mondragon's work injury, and concluded that the evidence 
was sufficient to show that the injury was compensable. Such conclusions were reached after 
considering the arguments raised by JP and how they pertained to the evidence in the record. By not 
responding to each motion, Mr. Mondragon risked the possibility that the Appeals Board might have 
been persuaded more by JP's arguments than by Mr. Mondragon's position; however, the arguments 
raised by JP in its motion for review were not persuasive in light of the evidence in the record. 
JP also submits that Judge Luke's award of benefits should be set aside so that JP can 
investigate whether Mr. Mondragon's claim is fraudulent. In its prior motion for review, JP 
submitted records ofMr. Mondragon's past claims for workers' compensation benefits in an attempt 
to impeach his credibility with regard to the present claim. The Appeals Board reviewed such 
materials and found there to be no actual evidence of fraud on Mr. Mondragon's part. The 
circumstances of the work accident, which occurred without witness and on the first day on the job, 
were considered by the Appeals Board when it reviewed the evidence in the record. Ultimately, the 
medical evidence that Mr. Mondragon sustained a twisting-type injury to his right knee consistent 
with the strain of carrying a wheelbarrow on the date in question convinced the Appeals Board that 
he had suffered a work-related injury and was entitled to the cost of treatment for such injury as 
outlined by the medical panel. JP's assertion that Mr. Mondragon is not credible and may be 
committing fraud is no more than speculation without evidence of actual fraud. Based on the 
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foregoing, the Appeals Board denies JP's request for reconsideration and leaves the Appeals Board's 
prior decision in effect. 
ORDER 
The Appeals Board denies the request for reconsideration filed by JP's Landscaping and 
Owners' Insurance Company and reaffirms its prior decision of August 25, 2015. It is so ordered. 
Dated this ~ay of September, 2015. 
~~~&z. 
Colleen Colton, C6air 
~o-sd~~ 
Patricia S. Drawe 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may appeal this Order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for Review 
with that Court within 30 days of the date of this Order. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Request for Reconsideration in the 
matt~ of Alberto Mondragon, case number 12-0664, was mailed, first class, postage prepaid this 
~day of September, 2015, to the following: 
A]berto Mondragon 
465 S 100 E 
Ivins UT 84738 
JP's Landscaping 
2775 E Washington Dam Rd 
Washington UT 84780 
Owners Insurance Co. 
Jake Olson Designated Agent 
Box 690 
Riverton UT 84065 
Mark R. Sumsion 
Richards Brandt Miller & Nelson 
Box 2465 
Salt Lake City UT 84110 
-~ILL2 Sara Danielson 
Utah Labor Commission 
